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Introduction
By Monroe Price

This workbook is designed to help the gathering
multitude, as they converge on São Paulo, further
understand the stakes involved in NETmundial. For
many, these stakes include the future of the internet—a
relatively recent phenomenon that has fundamentally
changed the structure of speech, altered the power
of states, disrupted long-standing institutions, and
provided new opportunities for creativity, commerce,
education, and innovation.
The internet is young, ubiquitous, full of further
promise, and a proven agent of social change. It is a
miracle of both governance and non-governance. The
challenge is to determine, against all odds, whether
this apparent miracle can be sustained—whether the
miracle, if it exists, can be more broadly extended and
the internet’s benefits more widely distributed.  But the
internet is not only a miracle; it is a riddle, a riddle of
contested jurisdiction, both universal and sovereign. As
far as governance issues are considered, the principles
that could be said to be “universal” in terms of guiding
the internet’s growth, and how these principles should
be determined, are among the difficult issues facing
participants at the NETmundial conference.
One of the goals of NETmundial is to demonstrate
that multistakeholder discussions can end in concrete
achievable goals or steps— showing that summits do
not just lead to fora and fora to regional conclaves.
In part, NETmundial is the product of impatience,
impatience with digital division, impatience with the
continuation of what were once thought to be provisional arrangements, and impatience and anger at existing
practices of surveillance and vast compromises of
privacy. But there will also be those who consider the
virtues of inertia where it is not clear what the consequences of particular changes might be.
The way in which NETmundial works to help establish
universal principles and a roadmap for governance is
ambitious both in substance and in process. It occurs
at a historical junction—one where the very geopolitics
of internet governance are at issue; and the geopolitics
of the internet overlap with major changes, if it can
quaintly be put this way, outside the internet. Questions
Page 4

of hegemony and control mix with philosophies of participation. NETmundial is, therefore, a complex effort
to redefine and redesign what constitutes legitimacy,
favoring one set of efforts or recommendations as “law”
or “universal.”
What provides legitimacy to one group of universal
principles rather than another? On the one hand, it is
the intrinsic merit of the principles. Do they capture
and refine an otherwise tangled set of conflicting
interests?  Has the final document produced a serviceable consensus while recognizing that not every issue
can suitably be addressed? And while there may be
a rough consensus of those around the table, what of
those who do not agree? Consensus is made easier
when dissonant and dissident voices are at bay. This is
always a danger, but its magnitude will be seen through
a rear view mirror.
In this sense, part of the challenge is negotiating
between concrete clarity and the comforting envelope
of vagueness and generality. Broad cushions can
smother difference.  Here too finding the right balance
is tricky. For example, how should the commitment to
human rights be articulated? Of course, considerations
of privacy should prevail, but naming the circumstances
that define privacy and when it can be waived will be
sometimes required.
Legitimacy arises from the substance of what is
presented, but it also arises from process. Legitimacy
within a state can be achieved through parliamentary
action or the ukase of a leader. But legitimacy in an
international domain is far more difficult to define.  Legitimacy often comes from treaty or decisions between
leaders. Here is where NETmundial becomes so
interesting and important. Because NETmundial is
part of a long and painful effort to rethink models of involvement and because the value of that effort is being
challenged, how process emerges from São Paulo is of
great significance.
So many deliberate and careful efforts have been
undertaken in the run-up to this meeting: the struggle
to pass and make into law the Marco Civil—a turning
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point for lawmaking in Brazil and a robust potential
model for other countries to follow; innovative steps at
ICANN; the establishment of a calculated organizing
committee with the desire to represent multistakeholderism in a new way. All of this and more constitutes
steps to bolster the event’s legitimacy.
In this workbook, we have tried to provide some background to NETmundial, including the history of the
meeting and the Marco Civil process in Brazil; some
background on the environment in Germany—with
particular attention to the link between the meeting and
the Snowden case; questions of legitimacy surrounding open processes for lawmaking; and comments on
the material presented to the organizing committee by
official and unofficial commenters.
This workbook is a project of the Internet Policy Observatory at the Annenberg School for Communication at
the University of Pennsylvania. A steering committee
included Ellery Roberts Biddle of Global Voices,
Ronaldo Lemos of the Rio Institute for Technology and
Society, and Monroe Price of Annenberg. They were
assisted by Laura Schwartz Henderson, Briar Smith,
and Alexandra Esenler. Funding for the Observatory
and this project comes from the Annenberg School and
a grant from the United States Department of State.

Monroe Price is director of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Global Communication Studies
(CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication,
where he works with a wide transnational network
of regulators, scholars, and practitioners in Europe,
Africa, Latin America, and Asia, as well as in the
United States. Price also founded the Programme in
Comparative Media Law and Policy at Oxford University and remains a research fellow there. He also
chairs the Center for Media and Communications
Studies at Central European University.
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Enter Brazil: NETmundial and the Effort to
Rethink Internet Governance
By Ronaldo Lemos
In 2014, the World Wide Web celebrates its 25th
birthday. So far, it has proven a momentous year for
the web. On March 14, the United States Government
announced that it would transition the IANA contract to
ICANN by a deadline of September 2015. On March
25, the Brazilian House of Representatives passed
the “Marco Civil da Internet,” a piece of legislation that
Sir Tim Berners-Lee hailed as an example of how to
answer his call for creating a “Magna Carta” for the
internet. Brazil is the first country in the world to heed
that call: The Marco Civil effectively creates a bill of
rights for the Brazilian internet, a first for the world.
Brazil’s announcement of hosting the NETmundial meeting could not be timelier. This short essay
describes the NETmundial meeting, provides some
context for the event, and speculates on what it could
achieve.

The Forces Behind NETmundial
As the other essays in this compilation demonstrate,
there are several internet governance processes
currently in place. I do not aim to describe them here
– researchers Deborah Brown, Joana Varon, and Lea
Kaspar have created a visualization1 of the existing
global internet governance ecosystem that provides a
good glimpse into their complexity.
Amidst ongoing processes led by UNESCO, the ITU,
and other non-UN entities, Brazil has stepped into the
picture. The timing could not be better. The origins of
NETmundial are closely connected with the Snowden
revelations. As Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff
was personally affected by the NSA espionage, the
case stirred a great deal of political furor, and the
Brazilian government moved quickly to respond. This
resulted in her cancellation of a state visit to the US
and her now famous speech before the UN. During
the Rousseff´s remarks at the opening of the 68th UN
1

http://www.gp-digital.org/publication/Internet-governance-
processes-visualising-the-playing-field/
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General Assembly in September 2013, 2 she stated
that the espionage “affects the international community
itself and demands a response from it.” She also
announced that Brazil would develop proposals for the
establishment of a “civilian multilateral framework for
the governance and use of the internet.”
In October, Rousseff met with ICANN CEO Fadi
Chehadé in Brasilia, Brazil’s capital. Shortly thereafter,
the two announced that Brazil would host an “international summit of government, industry, civil society and
academia” in April 2014. The term “summit” was later
replaced by “conference,” avoiding the connotation that
it would be exclusively a governmental meeting.
The organizational efforts for NETmundial followed
suit, with further arrangements and negotiations taking
place during the Internet Governance Forum in Bali
(October 2013), and at the ICANN meeting in Buenos
Aires (November 2013). A clear sign that Brazil was
increasing its participation in internet governance
processes was the attendance of high-level governmental officials at these meetings, including Minister
of Communications Paulo Bernardo, members of the
Brazilian Telecommunications Agency, and the Ministry
of Foreign Relations.
In November, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
(CGI.br) released further details indicating that the
conference would be organized by CGI.br in partnership with 1Net, an “open platform” that emerged out of
the efforts to draft the “Montevideo Statement on the
Future of Internet Cooperation,”3 released on October
7, 2013 after a meeting of several multistakeholder
technical standards organizations (IETF, W3C, ICANN
and others). CGI.br also identified the two principal
objectives of the conference:
2
3

Dilma Rousseff, “Remarks by Dilma Rousseff at the UN 68th
General Assembly,” Voltaire Network, September 24, 2013,
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180382.html.
“Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,”
ICANN, October 7, 2013, https://www.icann.org/en/news/
announcements/announcement-07oct13-en.htm.
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(a) the elaboration of a set of international principles of
		
internet governance;
(b) to propose a roadmap for future developments of
the internet governance ecosystem.
Unlike other processes, NETmundial does not intend to
be a recurring, ongoing effort. In principle, it is intended
to take place only once – it is something of an experiment. Even if one cannot find it in the official documents,
another goal of the conference is to demonstrate in
practice a set of “multistakeholder” examples, and
to articulate how they could be implemented in other
internet governance fora going forward.
A good example of this experimental approach is
the co-organization of NETmundial in partnership
with 1Net. This has led to some degree of criticism,
including debates about the organization’s legitimacy
to effectively represent the full diversity of “civil society.”
In support of 1Net, academics such as Milton Mueller
have claimed that the organization “is not a movement,
but a platform for coordinating the diverse groups in
a single place.” Without delving deeper into the controversy, such debates demonstrate the challenges
of building a balanced and legitimate process that
accounts for the issue of agency and representation,
an issue that largely remains unresolved in multistakeholder processes.
As Brazilian internet pioneer and CGI.br member
Carlos Afonso put it: “The Brazilian government or the
group organizing NETmundial will not, of course, be
able to reach everyone on a proactive basis. But they
are very open, very open, to receive all the suggestions, all the proposals.”4

What is NETmundial Trying to
Achieve?
As mentioned above, the two objectives of NETmundial
are the elaboration of a set of international principles of
internet governance, and the proposition of a roadmap
for future developments of the internet governance
ecosystem.

4

Audio recording from ICANN meeting, November 2013, http://
audio.icann.org/meetings/buenosaires2013/chehadeig-20nov13-en.mp3.

Regarding the elaboration of a set of international
principles, Brazil has been involved in an effort similar
to this at the national level for quite some time. In
2009, the CGI.br approved an important document
called “Principles for the Governance and Use of the
Internet.”5 This document created a list of 10 principles,
including “freedom, privacy and human rights,” “democratic and collaborative governance,” and “neutrality of
the network.”
It is no coincidence that President Rousseff articulated
similar principles in her remarks at the UN General
Assembly, namely:
1. Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual
and respect for human rights.
2. Open, multilateral and democratic governance,
carried out with transparency by stimulating
collective creativity and the participation of society,
Governments and the private sector.
3. Universality that ensures the social and human
development and the construction of inclusive and
non-discriminatory societies.
4. Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs,
customs and values.
5. Neutrality of the network, guided only by technical
and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to
restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any
other purposes.” 6
Moreover, the Brazilian House of Representatives
passed the Marco Civil in March 2014. If the bill is
also passed by the Senate, it will be a clear effort to
turn those principles into law. Brazil’s experience can
serve as an inspiration – and a policymaking roadmap
– for other countries, beginning with the NETmundial
meeting.
It is likely that Brazil will try to project the local experience to the international level. One important aspect in
that sense is that Article 24 of the Marco Civil sets forth
that internet governance in Brazil must be “governed
by multistakeholder mechanisms that are transparent,
collaborative and democratic, with the participation
5

6

“Principles for the Governance and Use of the Internet,”
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, 2009, http://www.cgi.br/
regulamentacao/pdf/resolucao-2009-003-pt-en-es.pdf. Available
in English, Portuguese, Spanish.
Dilma Rousseff, “Remarks by Dilma Rousseff at the UN 68th
General Assembly,” Voltaire Network, September 24, 2013,
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180382.html.
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of the government, the business sector, civil society,
and the academic community.” This is precisely the
governance structure of the CGI.br (Brazilian Internet
Steering Committee) itself, which is governed by the
same directives, and the organizer of NETmundial.
With NETmundial, one of the goals of the Brazil meeting
is to demonstrate that an open approach regarding
participation is not only desirable but necessary for
internet governance processes. The country adopted
this approach in drafting the Marco Civil itself, which
was built collaboratively by means of an open online
and offline process. It also sets the example for internet
governance at the local level, by means of the governance model actually adopted by the CGI.br. This
expanded multistakeholder approach is also desired
and supported by a number of civil society organizations.7
From an international perspective, the NETmundial
efforts constrain the Brazilian position regarding the
transition of the IANA functions. As the likely origin of
the world’s first comprehensive “bill of rights” for the
internet, and as the host of this meeting, Brazil has
distanced itself from the possibility of having the IANA
functions undertaken by the International Telecommunication Union, an idea that the country has entertained
in the recent past. Brazil is now committed to supporting
a transition that points in the direction of an organization that operates within the “global multistakeholder
community.” It is worth mentioning that this was the
expression used by the US Commerce Department
to announce its intent to transition the internet domain
name (IANA) functions.8 With NETmundial, Brazil takes
a step in the direction of the US, even if the objective
is to later propose a “third way.” This impression was
reinforced by Secretary John Kerry’s tweet about the
conference that states, “Thanks to Gvt of #Brazil for
inviting U.S. to co-host #NETmundial in Sao Paolo.
Everyone has a stake in #Internetgovernance.”9

7
8

9

“Civil society representatives welcome NTIA announcement on
transition of key internet domain name functions,” Best Bits Network, March 16, 2014, http://bestbits.net/ntia-announcement/.
“NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain
Name Functions,” National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, US Department of Commerce, March 14, 2014,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announcesintent-transition-key-Internet-domain-name-functions.
Tweet from verified account of John Kerry. Unique link:
https://twitter.com/JohnKerry/status/431467951116398592
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The State of Play Right Before the
Conference
The open call for proposals launched by NETmundial
received 188 contributions from 46 different countries.
The countries with the largest number of contributions
are the United States (31 contributions), Brazil (16),
United Kingdom (7) and India (7).
The breakdown of the different sectors contributing is
as follows: 31% civil society, 23% business, 15% government, 11% academic community, and 8% technical
community.10 It is important to note that some criticism
has emerged regarding the small number of contributions/participation on the part of governments and the
technical community.
From the practical perspective, there are concerns
about how much of the meeting will be devoted to the
discussion of internet principles, seen as a long-term
goal, and how much of it will be devoted to the transition of the IANA functions, a short-term goal. Such
concerns arise regarding the possibility that the discussion about principles might cast a shadow over the
more urgent discussion about the role of ICANN.
In this regard, the Internet Governance Project
launched a proposal led by scholars Milton Mueller and
Brenden Kuerbis that focused specifically on the transition of IANA. The goal of the proposal is “to resolve
the 15-year controversy over the United States government’s special relationship to the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).” The
already controversial11 proposal “involves removing
root zone management functions from ICANN and
creating an independent and neutral private sector
consortium to take them over.”12 It states that it “will be
… formally submitted to NETmundial.” This promises to
be one of the most important practical debates during
the NETmundial event.

10 “Submissions to NETmundial,” Knowledge Commons, http://
www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/internet-governancemeeting-in-brasil-23-24/submissions-to-netmundial/.
11 Monika Ermert, “Privatize, Don’t Internationalise, Internet
Oversight, Academics Say,” Intellectual Property Watch, March
4, 2014, http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/04/privatize-dontinternationalise-Internet-oversight-academics-say/.
12 Brenden Kuerbis, “A Roadmap for Globalizing IANA,” Internet
Governance Project, March 3, 2014, http://www.Internetgovernance.org/2014/03/03/a-roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/.
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In summary, NETmundial is a promising event, but its
success will be measured by how much of its discussions and goals will be undertaken by other fora. Ideally,
the efforts of NETmundial should become part of the
next IGF meetings. But for that to be effective, the IGF
itself must evolve. It needs, for instance, the ability to
set recommendations going forward. The evolution of
IGF may be a critical topic for discussion at NETmundial, as part of its goal is to set the “roadmap for future
developments of the internet governance ecosystem.”

Ronaldo Lemos is the director of the Rio Institute for
Technology & Society, and professor at the Rio de
Janeiro State University’s Law School. He is member
of the Mozilla Foundation Board, and the Access Now
Board, among others. He was one of the architects for
the “Marco Civil da Internet”, a law establishing a bill
of rights for the internet in Brazil. Ronaldo earned his
LL.B. and LL.D. from the University of São Paulo, and
his LL.M. from Harvard Law School. He is currently a
non-resident visiting scholar with the MIT Media Lab.
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The Ever Evolving Landscape of Internet
Governance
By Markus Kummer
NETmundial, to be hosted by the Brazilian government in late April, will be an opportunity to address
some basic questions and concerns governments
and users alike have been asking, in various ways, for
over a decade. While it may not be possible to provide
answers to all open questions and concerns, the Brazil
debate will nevertheless be a signal to the world that
the multistakeholder community is seeking to fulfil its
commitment towards gaining a better u
 nderstanding of
all the different dimensions of internet governance. This
will be important as without a clear signal in this regard,
the pressure to move to more traditional, top-down intergovernmental arrangements will increase. Ultimately,
those who seek a different outcome have to answer
the question of how to move to a new consensus.
NETmundial can be the beginning of gaining a better
understanding of what a new international consensus
might look like.

I. Internet Governance at a
Crossroads
The internet was built on basic libertarian and democratic axioms; it was developed and deployed outside
the sphere of government influence, with the academic
and technical communities playing the leading role.
Their distributed, informal, and bottom-up decisionmaking process challenges the traditional world of
governments, which is based on the principle of
national sovereignty, as enshrined in the UN Charter.
Since the 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia, national
sovereignty has been the cornerstone of how governments envision and conduct global governance and
participate in international affairs. Developing countries
in particular have a young national identity and attach
great importance to the fundamental principle of
national sovereignty. Some of these countries wish to
“extend national sovereignty into cyber-space,” which
to many developing countries makes more sense than
the abstract notion of multistakeholder governance.
In many ways it is a debate between the traditional
concept of national sovereignty and the cyberlibertarPage 10

ian vision of the world that is best embodied in David D.
Clark’s famous words “We reject: kings, presidents and
voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running
code”13 and in John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace.”14 These two visions
have dominated the debate on internet governance
since its inception more than ten years ago.
2014 will be a pivotal year as the future of the internet
and internet governance is at a crossroads. The open
question is whether there will be an international
consensus on the multistakeholder internet governance
model or a shift towards a more intergovernmental
model. The internet as a network of networks has
enabled the creation of collaborative human networks
based on trust. This trust was shared by internet
users.15 Last year’s disclosures of pervasive government surveillance programs were akin to a seismic shift
in the internet governance landscape. The large-scale
nature of these programs made internet users realize
that the chain of trust - which is essential to the proper
functioning of the internet - had been broken. This
realization created a sense of urgency to review current
internet governance arrangements. Major conferences
are taking place in 2014 and 2015, providing opportunities to restore trust in the internet and its governance.
However, these conferences also pose a threat to the
open, global, and interoperable internet, as some governments will be tempted to impose top-down internet
governance arrangements, which could ultimately
endanger the internet’s openness and lead to its fragmentation.

13 In a presentation given at the 24th meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
14 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, February 8, 1996.” (1996) https://projects.eff.
org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
15 The term user refers to all stakeholders – governments, private
sector, civil society, academic and technical communities and
individual users belonging to all these categories.
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II. The History of the Debate
The debate on how best to deal with internet governance has a long history. The internet is now a global
resource and a key factor contributing to today’s globalized world. It is therefore not a surprise that more and
more governments, businesses, and people, including
ordinary users, take an interest in issues related to
the internet. The internet is no longer exclusively a
medium for academic and scientific communities, and
today it has huge social and economic impacts for most
countries. The internet has become so important that
governments consider it to to be part of their critical
infrastructure and want both to know how it is being run
and to have a say in its governance.
Discussions about how to administer the commercial
internet started in the 1990s, but these talks were
confined to a circle of insiders. Without delving too
deep into the history, it is worthwhile to recall that the
Clinton Administration decided that a traditional intergovernmental set-up would be sufficient for the rapidly
evolving technology. This was one of the elements that
led to the establishment of the Internet Corporation
of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998.
Since then, the US Government has retained different
levels of oversight over some core internet governance
functions. Meanwhile in 1998 in Ottawa, Canada, the
Ministers of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) met and came to the
conclusion that there was no need for any regulation
on e-commerce, as regulation might stifle the further
evolution of the underlying internet technology. In the
same year, the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the World
Trade Organization, held in Geneva, Switzerland,
came to a similar conclusion and decided to impose a
moratorium on any e-commerce regulation.
While ICANN was being formed and governments were
agreeing to take a hands-off approach to the internet, in
1998 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
held its Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis
and agreed to hold a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This proposal was very much in
line with traditional UN summits on major issues that
face the global community. The underlying motivation
of these traditional UN summits is to provide a forum
for governments to come together in search of global
solutions for major challenges. In short, the objective
for WSIS was to apply the traditional governance

model to information and communication technologies
(ICTs), driven by the internet.
This push for a more regulated internet came to the
fore during the preparatory phase of the first phase of
WSIS, held in Geneva in 2003, when the term ‘internet
governance’ first emerged. WSIS in 2003 adopted the
Geneva Declaration of Principles16 and introduced the
notion of multistakeholder governance. However, the
words used in these principles mean different things to
different people. For instance, to most governments the
term “mulitlateral” refers to classical intergovernmental
cooperation, however, non-governmental actors would
like to redefine multilateral as multistakeholder cooperation.
At the second phase of WSIS, held in Tunis in 2005,
heads of state and governments recognized that
the current distributed, bottom-up, multistakeholder
internet governance arrangements based on voluntary
cooperation between many different organizations were
well suited to the underlying distributed technology.
WSIS confirmed that “the existing arrangements for
internet governance have worked effectively to make
the internet the highly robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium that it is today.”17 The working
definition of internet governance, as contained in the
Tunis Agenda, was also a major step forward towards
the recognition of the legitimacy of multistakeholder
processes.18 In short, one essential conclusion of WSIS
was that multistakeholder cooperation at all levels is a
precondition for sound and good internet governance
and that international coordination cannot work if there
is no coordination at national and regional levels. While
this was a significant outcome of the WSIS process,
governments also made it clear that there was room
for improvement. In essence, governments wanted to
16 Geneva Declaration of Principles, (ITU, 2003), para. 48,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html. “The
international management of the internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of
governments, the private sector, civil society and international
organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure
functioning of the internet, taking into account multilingualism.”
17 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (ITU, 2005), para. 55,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html.
18 “A working definition of internet governance is the development
and application by governments, the private sector and civil
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms,
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape
the evolution and use of the internet.” Ibid., para. 34.
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know how the internet was being run and they wanted
to have a say in it.

as termed by WSIS, a “global facility available to the
public.”20

WSIS did not mark the end of the debate; it was more a
kind of truce. It was the beginning of what has become
a more intense debate about the future of the internet
and what kind of society we want. WSIS took the debate
on how to run and manage the internet out of a circle
of insiders and put it in the limelight of an international
policy debate.

Second, there is a geopolitical dimension with many
countries, developing countries in particular, feeling
uncomfortable about the role of the US Government,
which, for historical reasons, has the ultimate authority
over some of the internet’s core resources. Critics of
the status quo assert that this authority should be
shared with the rest of the world, as they consider the
internet a global good. Specifically, they compare the
situation to the world of telecommunications, which
is regulated by the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) where all countries have an equal say
through a “one-country, one-vote system.” In their view,
the same model should apply to the internet. On the
other hand, non-governmental stakeholders from all
parts of the world make it clear that they feel left out of
classical intergovernmental arrangements and prefer
that the internet run in a bottom-up collaborative way.

The debate since Tunis has grown in importance
because the internet has also grown. Between Geneva
and Tunis the internet broke the mark of 1 billion users.
Today, there are 2.5 billion users online, and many applications that were in their infancy in the early 2000s
are now part of users’ everyday experiences. The
greater its economic, social, and political weight, the
more attention governments will pay to the internet.

III. A Multidimensional Debate
The debates during WSIS and in the IGF show that
there are several dimensions to internet governance.
The first dimension concerns issues of polity. The
role of governments in managing the internet and
the relationship between governments, the private
sector, and other stakeholders are key to the debate.
Those who defend the traditional intergovernmental
approach would like to see governments at the top of
the pyramid, while some governments, mainly western
democracies, are happy to take a back seat and let
the non-government actors take the lead. While the
internet community advocates for an open, inclusive,
and bottom-up approach to internet governance, it
must be recognized that current governance arrangements are very different from the basic architecture
and traditional design of international cooperation.
The challenge therefore is to reconcile the concept
of national sovereignty with the internet model and its
borderless nature. While there is no easy way to do
this, one way forward could be an evolving concept of
“shared sovereignty”19 over a common public good or,

19 Sherrill Brown Wells and Samuel F. Jr Wells, “Shared
Sovereignty in the European Union: Germany’s Economic Governance,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 3 (2008): 30–43,
http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/083203wells.
pdf.
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Third, there is a strong developmental dimension to this
debate. This has two components: a digital divide issue
as well as a participation issue. Developing countries
want cheap internet access. Broadband access at a
subscription rate of 50 USD/month may seem like a
reasonable cost for users in developed economies, but
this can be an unsurmountable burden in a country
where an average salary may hardly exceed 200
USD. Developing countries, with their limited human
and financial resources, also find great difficulty in
making their voice heard in distributed governance arrangements and feel marginalized.21 They feel more
at home in the traditional intergovernmental approach
of UN processes. What is more, due to the complex
fragmented nature of the various internet governance
mechanisms, developing countries find it difficult to
determine what is going on, which institution is dealing
with what aspect of governance, and what possibilities
they have to contribute meaningful input to ongoing
processes. Despite this, developing countries would
like to have a seat at the table and take part in discussions on the internet, as they see the internet as
a powerful tool to help them reach objectives for their
economic and social development.
20 Ibid.
21 Don MacLean et al., Louder Voices: Strengthening Developing
Country Participation in International ICT Decision-Making,
Report (Panos Institute, February 26, 2009), http://panos.org.uk/
wp-content/files/2011/03/louder_voicesGjJeXx.pdf.  

APRIL 2014   Stakes are high: Essays on brazil and the future of the global internet

Fourth, there is an economic dimension, which, by and
large, is also part of the developmental dimension. As
in the off-line world, economic dynamics are dominated
by multinational players in the Global North. Developing countries find this unfair, and again compare the
situation with the telecommunications sector and would
like to change charging arrangements and adapt them
to the telecom model, i.e. share the cost of international
leased lines and move to a “settlement” of internet
traffic. This view is also shared by some incumbent
telecom operators in developed economies, however,
it is rejected by major internet players who see such
a model as an antithesis to the architecture of the
internet. These players point out that a large amount
of the connectivity costs are locally generated and
that the right regulatory environment, with liberalized
markets and increased competition, will bring down
prices. In addition, there is a link to the linguistic and
cultural aspects. Internet charges are also linked to
local content as users prefer local content when local
content exists. In connection with Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs), the access to local content will also
reduce international charges. In general, it is felt that
that the most appropriate level to address issues of
access is the national level and that the main locus
for policy development and implementation is at the
national level.
Fifth, there is the technological dimension. The internet
is a new technology based on packet-switching. It
took time for regulators familiar with telecommunications to adapt to this new technology. These regulators
are used to solutions aimed at a different technology,
circuit-switching, and they may be tempted to rely on
solutions that are not adapted to the internet’s technology.
Finally there is a sixth social and cultural dimension.
Human rights in general and freedom of expression in
particular rank high in this debate. Western media see
the debate on internet governance as an opportunity
for authoritarian governments to attempt to stifle the
medium and to gain control over its content. This is
seen as an attack on the very essence of the internet
which from its beginning has been an extraordinary
medium of empowerment, providing new levels of
access to information and knowledge, irrespective of
borders and unprecedented in history. Culture and
linguistics are also prominent parts of this debate that
strongly link to developmental and political dimensions. The internet developed as a medium based on

the English language and as a vehicle for the English
language. Many non-native English speakers resented,
and still resent, this and take it as another sign of the
cultural dominance of the English language. They want
to make use of their own language on the internet.
Major European languages also based on Latin script
had the means to quickly develop their own content
and digitalize their written heritage, making it accessible through the internet. But even these languages
took some time in developing domain names that are
compatible with their own spelling. For languages not
based on Latin script, the problem is more complex.
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Arabic are languages
in which huge progress has been made with the introduction of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)
as these languages have a critical mass to generate
their own content. However, languages that are spoken
by fewer people face a more arduous up-hill struggle.
Their market may be too small for developing commercially viable software that allows the transcription of the
language for computer use. This mix of one language’s
dominance, a perceived better deal for some languages
(primarily from rich and developed countries), linked to
the absence of their own language from the internet ,
can lead to a feeling of marginalization, if not alienation
for developing non-English countries.

IV. Growing Discontent
The inconclusive debate that dominated WSIS has
been simmering in the background since 2005 and
continued in the broader UN context. ‘Enhanced cooperation’ became one of the buzzwords that remained
unresolved. Discussions about ‘enhanced cooperation’
– one of the “WSIS leftovers” – remind us that some
governments see limitations in existing multistakeholder processes. Simultaneously, the internet found
its way into the discussions of the General Assembly’s
First Committee that deals with disarmament, global
challenges, and threats to peace.
During the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012, the debate rekindled and
made news headlines. WCIT, in many ways, brought the
economic dimension of internet governance to the fore.
However, the economic dimension of the WCIT debate
overlooked that the best argument in favor of the multistakeholder internet model was the internet’s ability to
foster creativity, innovation, empowerment, economic
growth, and job creation. There is economic evidence
that underpins this argument. The Organisation for
Page 13
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
has already unequivocally recognized the internet’s
economic weight, as have various consultancies.22 The
OECD Internet Economy Outlook 201223 highlights the
spread of the internet throughout the economy and
expects that the internet will continue to expand while
businesses, individuals, and governments will find new
innovative ways to leverage its potential. Governments
also need to be made aware of the underlying philosophy of standards development, based on the Open
Standard Paradigm,24 by the leading standard developing organizations. The approach of “innovation without
permission” has fostered the internet’s development.
At the same time, WCIT was also very much a wakeup
call that revealed many unanswered questions and
concerns that developing countries had with respect
to the internet. There is no doubt that developing
countries face a multi-faceted problem, and that there
is no simple solution to solve it. It is an issue that is
part of the “digital divide” nexus. However, developing
countries may also need assistance to start setting up
their IXPs and regional backbones, and developing
their local content. WCIT was a very complex negotiation, and it would be oversimplifying to divide the world
in two camps, those who signed the treaty and those
who did not, as there were some strong supporters for
the internet model amongst countries that signed the
treaty.
The geopolitical dimension of the internet governance
debate was an undercurrent at WCIT. This undercurrent was swept to the surface by the disclosures of the
pervasive government surveillance programs in June
2013. Although the surveillance programs had nothing
to do with the authority over the IANA functions, critics
of the role of the United States conflated the two issues
and used these revelations to renew their calls for
further globalization of internet governance arrangements. As called for in the Montevideo statement,25
issued by the leaders of the organizations responsible
for the internet’s technical infrastructure, the key to the
22 McKinsey, Boston Consulting
23 OECD Internet Economy Outlook 2012 (OECD
Publishing, 2012), http://www.keepeek.com/oecd/media/
science-and-technology/oecd-internet-economy-outlook-2012_
9789264086463-en#page1.
24 “Principles,” Open Stand, n.d., http://open-stand.org/principles/.
25 “Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,”
Internet Society, October 2013), http://www.internetsociety.org/
news/montevideo-statement-future-internet-cooperation.

Page 14

further globalization of internet governance arrangements is a globalization of the IANA functions.

V. The IGF as a Defense Line of
Multistakeholderism
The main pillar of the complex internet governance
debate after WSIS is the Internet Governance Forum
(IGF). In Tunis, heads of state and governments felt
there was a need to continue the dialogue on internet
governance in a new setting. They gave a mandate
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
convene a new multistakeholder forum for public policy
dialogue– the IGF. The IGF mandate is very broad and
allows for discussing almost any policy subject related
to internet governance. It is also clear, insofar as it
states, that the IGF is not a decision-making body.
The IGF and all the national and regional IGF initiatives
are the foremost multistakeholder venue that familiarizes governments with the internet model. It is also
the only place that touches on all the dimensions of
internet governance.
The IGF was meant to provide a platform for a dialogue
between governments and the internet community.26 It
was in many ways the beginning of a dialogue between
these two different cultures: on the one hand the private
sector and the internet community’s informal processes
and culture of “rough consensus,” and on the other
hand the more formal, structured world of governments
and intergovernmental organizations. In this respect it
was a learning process in which both cultures took their
first steps towards working with each other.
Quite unlike traditional United Nations processes, the
IGF serves to bring people together from various stakeholder groups as equals, but not to make decisions or
negotiate. Rather, they discuss, exchange information,
and share best practices with each other. While the IGF
may not have decision-making abilities, it informs and
inspires those who do. The forum facilitates a common
understanding of how to maximize internet opportunities, use them for the benefit of all nations and peoples,
and address risks and challenges that arise.

26 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his address at the inaugural IGF meeting.
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From its first meeting in Athens in 2006 to its most recent
one in Bali in 2013, the IGF has continuously evolved,
and the quality of the dialogue has progressively
matured. The IGF has created a sense of community
that allows challenging issues to be discussed in an
open and frank manner. Part of the value of the multistakeholder approach is both agreeing and disagreeing
on various issues and encouraging participants to
show respect and listen to each other’s arguments,
positions, and needs.
The lack of decision-making power should not be seen
as a weakness, but rather as the strength of the IGF.
Nobody needs to be afraid of the IGF. It will not be
able to make “the wrong decision.” It has no power of
redistribution. For example, it will not be able to decide
that from now on institution X should no longer be in
charge of function B, which should be taken care of
by institution Y, and so on. However, the IGF has the
power of recognition. It can identify issues that need
to be dealt with by the international community, and
it can shape the decisions that will be taken in other
fora. The governance model of the IGF is built on ‘soft
governance’ and ‘soft power.’27 The IGF uses a ‘soft
governance’ approach to the internet by shaping and
informing the decision-making processes of other institutions and governments, and preparing the ground for
negotiations that will take place in other fora and not
at the IGF meetings themselves. It can identify issues
of concern and put them on the international policy
agenda. Paradoxically, the apparent weakness may
be the comparative advantage of the IGF. In this sense,
the IGF can serve as a laboratory, a neutral space, an
enlightened space for debate, where all actors can
raise issues. Nothing they say at the IGF can be held
against them.
It should also be noted that some see the IGF as a
model for other international policy areas.28 In a
broader context, the IGF model of bringing all stakeholders together to discuss, on an equal footing, issues
of mutual concern can be of interest to other fora. The
progressive empowerment of non-governmental actors
points to the conclusion that world politics are much
more than the sum of relations between governments.
27 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004).
28 John Mathiason, Internet Governance: The New Frontier of
Global Institutions (Routledge, 2008), 149.

Globalization, fuelled by the rapid development of ICTs
with the near instantaneous diffusion of information,
makes politics a more complex trans-national process.

VI. Strengthening the IGF
The NETmundial conference comes at a critical
juncture. Its focus on principles and the roadmap for the
evolution of internet governance should allow for constructive and forward-looking proposals to materialize
and reaffirm the basic principles of the multistakeholder
model. It will feed into other processes such as the UN
process of ‘enhanced cooperation’29 or the ITU’s Plenipotentiary Conference. However, these processes are
intergovernmental in nature and lack the input and
expertise of all the other stakeholders.
This leaves IGF 2014 in September well placed to
consider the outputs from NETmundial and all the other
processes, and to discuss how best to move forward to
rebuild online trust. The IGF has matured sufficiently
to take an additional step towards producing more
tangible takeaways and the time has come to enable
the IGF to assume enhanced responsibilities.
The IGF was not created to provide solutions, but to
provide a space for dialogue, to identify problems, and
explore possible solutions. In this respect, the IGF has
exceeded expectations, it has proved to be a space for
discussions that could not have taken place anywhere
else. For those who attended the 2006 IGF meeting
in Athens, the discussions held in Bali would have
been unimaginable. Discussions then were tense,
unstructured, and there was much mistrust between
stakeholders. The IGF is still evolving and coming into
its own, and the shape it will eventually settle into lies
in the hands of its stakeholders.
The Bali meeting once again proved the IGF’s worth as
a “go to place” where the community gathers to share
experiences and exchange information. In many ways,
it was a defining moment. It lived up to the challenge
created by government surveillance and focused
on the need to rebuild the trust of internet users. By
tackling surveillance head-on, the proverbial elephant
29 Markus Kummer, “Internet Governance: What Is Enhanced
Cooperation?,” Internet Society Blog, July 2, 2012, http://www.
internetsociety.org/blog/2012/07/internet-governance-what-enhanced-cooperation.
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in the room, and by allowing for an open and frank
discussion of government surveillance and monitoring, it proved its value. The IGF facilitated this difficult
debate and proved that it had matured and lived up to
the expectations of participants who wanted to voice
their concerns. The underlying theme in Bali was the
necessity to rebuild internet users’ trust in the Internet,
its function, and how it fits into society. There was a
general agreement that the IGF was the privileged
place to pursue these discussions and that the multistakeholder format was the only way forward.
Discussions about internet principles have been high on
the IGF agenda since 2010. At the 2010 IGF meeting in
Vilnius, Brazilian internet principles were proposed as
a possible model for adoption. While these principles
found broad support, the IGF was not ready to take the
next step. Similar discussions also took place at subsequent IGF meetings in Nairobi and Baku. In Bali, the
IGF was ready to take the discussion forward towards
points of convergence.
The IGF has matured and it is now ready take it a step
further, towards more tangible outputs or outcomes, as
was suggested by the Working Group on IGF Improvement, convened by the Commission on Science and
Technology for Development (CSTD).30
Given the current challenges and given the necessity
to restore trust and confidence in the internet, it is
essential to involve all stakeholders, from developed
as well as developing countries, in discussions on the
future evolution of the internet. The IGF is best placed
to take the discussions forward as it provides protection, legitimacy, and credibility to the multistakeholder
model, since it is the only truly open and inclusive multistakeholder platform under the UN umbrella. The IGF
protects the multistakeholder model by acting as a dam
that prevents the discussion from moving into a more
traditional intergovernmental setting. It has the legitimacy through its link to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as its convenor and, last but not least,
it has the credibility derived from its open and inclusive
multistakeholder approach that allows for the input of
expert opinions on all issues under discussion.

30 See recommendations by the CSTD Working Group on
Improvements to the IGF, March 16, 2012, http://unctad.org/
meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/a67d65_en.pdf.
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The IGF so far has very limited resources. For the IGF
to respond to current challenges and to strengthen the
IGF to enable it to play a more prominent role in the
internet governance landscape, it is necessary to put
it on a more stable and sustainable financial basis.31
Reforms will be necessary and one perceived need
is for the IGF to produce more concrete take-aways,
whatever form they may take. The Internet Society
suggests seeking inspiration from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in terms of producing
outcome documents based on voluntary adoption and
starting substantive intersessional work.32
The NETmundial meeting and the concerns that led
to its creation were part of the discussions during the
IGF in Bali. Other processes are considering similar
questions, such as the Working Group on Enhanced
Cooperation of the UN Commission on Science and
Technology for Development (CSTD), the WSIS+10
Review as well as the ITU’s World Telecommunication
Development Conference (WTDC) and Plenipotentiary
Conference.
The 2014 IGF Istanbul meeting could be the starting
point for such an evolution and take the discussion from
NETmundial forward on the long path towards creating
a new chain of trust for the internet. This will be a long
process, and all stakeholders need to work together in
this endeavor. In getting this process started, there is a
need to focus on some concrete issues, such as ethical
data handling, data protection, and a right to privacy, as
essential building blocks in restoring online trust.
2014 will be a crucial year for internet governance
going forward. The international community is called
upon to reflect what kind of internet we want and how
we want to answer the many open questions related to
its governance. The many meetings dealing with the
internet will strive to find answers, and it is hoped that
the community will be able to align itself and find a new
international consensus on multistakeholder internet
governance. International consensus on internet
policies and principles is unlikely to come from only
one source; instead it is likely to be derived from the
31 Communication by the European Commission, http://ec.europa.
eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_
id=4453.
32 Internet Society, “IGF 2014- Request for Public Input Submission by the Internet Society,” February 10, 2014, http://www.
internetsociety/sites/default/files/IGF-2014Request-for-PublicInput.pdf.
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voluntary adoption of compatible principles developed
in different fora. The IGF and its national and regional
meetings could play a preeminent role in this regard.

Markus Kummer is the Internet Society’s Vice-President for Public Policy. He has extensive experience
with Internet policy at the global, regional, and
national levels. Before joining the Internet Society
in February 2011, he was the Executive Coordinator
of the Secretariat supporting the United Nations’
Internet Governance Forum. In February 2013, he
was appointed by the United Nations as Interim Chair
of the Open Consultations and meetings of the IGF
Multistakeholder Advisory Group preparing the 2013
IGF annual meeting.
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Collaborative Lawmaking as a Knowledge
Problem
Lessons learned from Internet Regulation in Brazil and Germany
By Wolfgang Schulz

I. Introduction
The Brazilian “Marco Civil” is a remarkable project
with regards to lawmaking in the knowledge society
in at least two respects: First, it attempts to create a
comprehensive legal framework for the basic information infrastructure of the knowledge society – the
internet. Secondly, the process of drafting the law has
been highly participatory.33 Considering that from the
beginning the internet has been associated with the
promise of participation, it is interesting to observe
that this piece of internet legislation has also become
a test case for participation by means of internet communication.34 In this regard, the Marco Civil process is
also significant as to how it reconstructs and seeks to
change elements of legitimacy. Legitimacy is key to the
acceptance of laws and regulations by those affected
including citizens, NGOs, governments, and corporations.
In this short essay, I aim to demonstrate the special
nature of the current debate about multistakeholder
ism as a new way for framing issues of legitimacy.  Moreover, I wish to describe another way in which
the Marco Civil process is innovative, namely as a
process for the production of knowledge. Lawmaking –
and changes in lawmaking brought about by the internet
– tend to be discussed mainly within a paradigm of em33 Fabro Steibel, “Designing online deliberation using web 2.0
technologies: drafting a bill of law on internet regulation in
Brazil,” In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, 38-43, ACM,
2012.
34 Yair Amichau-Hamburger, Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, and
Samuel-Arzan Tal, “E-empowerment: Empowerment by the
Internet.” Computers in Human Behavior, 24, no 5 (2008):
1776-1789; Stephen Coleman, and Jay g. Blumler, The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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powerment.35 However, the aspect of changes in the
knowledge ecology has been neglected. This article
addresses lawmaking as a problem of knowledge and
attempts to outline what might be considered as “good
lawmaking” when looking through this lens. Taking that
as a starting point, I share some observations on the
Marco Civil process from an outsider’s perspective and
reflect on some experience gained by policymakers
in Germany as they have charted a path towards an
internet-adequate regulatory framework.

II. Lawmaking in the Knowledge
Society
1. Data, Information and Knowledge
Before we dive into lawmaking and its knowledge
aspects we should clarify our understanding of
knowledge. Conceptually, knowledge is closely linked
to information and data. Gregory Bateson, who is
associated with a semiotic approach to information,
generally understands information as “a difference that
makes a difference.”36 This approach has its roots in
the idea of the single difference being the elementary
unit of data.
Information in a social sense must make a difference to
a sensing being – to us as humans, who are living and
communicating in social formations. Based on that,
knowledge appears as information that is organized,
accumulated, and embedded within a social context.37
35 “European e-Participation: Summary Report,” European
Commission, November 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1499,
p. 5,
36 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, (New York:
Ballantine, 1972; Northvale, New Jersey: Jaron Aronson Inc.,
2009) p. 460.
37 Helmut Willke, Systemisches Wissensmanagement, From
Systemic Knowledge Management. 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Lucius
& Lucius, 2001) p. 11.
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Neither information nor knowledge is a resource that
can be put into procedures such as organizational
management or lawmaking. It has to be constructed by
the knowledge-processing individual or organization;
however, the creation of context generates a design for
the process of learning.

2. The Knowledge Aspect of Lawmaking
Lawmaking is first and foremost a political matter. In a
democracy, the definition of what might be considered
a social problem and which regulatory means should
be applied to solve it, should be designed as a process
of “public reasoning”.38In representative democracies it
is, on the one hand, the main task of the parliament
to convey democratic legitimacy. On the other hand,
the parliament remains the main actor in the process
of lawmaking. Notwithstanding the importance of
participatory instruments for citizens, multistakeholder
forums, and other means of preparing legislation in
representative democracies, current procedures are
designed in such a way that the decision of the parliament constitutes the transfer of legitimacy.
The “Governance Turn” in regulatory theory has not
changed that. The Governance approach merely
shows that if one analyses the normative structure in a
given field, it is not enough to construe the applicable
state-set laws.39 Aspects such as private ordering or
regulation by “code” have to be considered as well. The
state gradually may be losing its status as the main
organizing actor, yet that does not mean that the state
loses its role as the primary entity that sets binding rules
which can be seen as the self-legislation of a society.
Coming back to the role of the parliament, in modern
democracies the government undertakes both the
designing of the actual law and the lawmaking.
Meanwhile the function of the parliament is basically to
38 Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist
Aufklärung? [An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?]” Berlinische Monatsschrift 12 (1784):pp. 481-494. An
English translation can be retrieved from: http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html
39 Gunnar Folke Schuppert, “Governance – auf der Suche
nach Konturen eines „anerkannt uneindeutigen Begriffs
[Governance – looking for outlines of an “admitted ambiguous term”],” Schuppert/Zürn (eds.), Governance in einer sich
wandelnden Welt. Wiesbaden 41 (2008): 13-40; Robert O.
Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and interdependence in the information age,” Foreign Affairs (1998): 81-94.

control the actions of government, even though formally
the parliament is the main actor in lawmaking.40
Against this background we can formulate a first set of
criteria for the quality of lawmaking: Are there mechanisms in place that ensure that the lawmaking can in
fact realize the will of the people? The above-mentioned
practice, that the government is in fact drafting most of
the laws, can already be seen as a challenge to this set
of criteria for lawmaking. It is plausible to assume that,
the more complex the deliberations of lawmaking are,
the more likely it is that the government will dominate
the parliament as far as knowledge about the actual
structures of the field which the law intends to impact.
This leads to a second set of criteria against which
the quality of laws can be measured: Good laws have
to be functionally adequate, effective, efficient, and
implementable.41 This set of criteria is specifically associated with knowledge problems, and can be illustrated
by examples taken from the internet sphere, though
similar examples could easily be drawn for biotech or
energy regulation as well as other complex fields of
society. Examples from the internet domain include:
Which aspects of the internet are relevant for the internet’s potential to foster innovation? Which policy
approaches affect those factors and might, therefore,
put the internet economy at risk? Is it technically
possible to make the internet “forget” personal data?
If we can assume that, at least generally speaking,
there is an information asymmetry between the government and a parliament, then there is an inherent
tension between the first set of quality criteria and the
second set. To put it differently: a knowledge society
40 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Macpherson Ed. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1980) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370h/7370-h.htm; Helmuth Schultze-Fielitz, “Theorie und
Praxis parlamentarischer Gesetzgebung – besonders des 9.
Deutschen Bundestages (1980 – 1983) [Theory and practice
in parliamentary lawmaking – especially of the 9th German
Bundestag (1980 – 1983)],” (Berlin: Duncker &Humblot, 1988)
p. 292; Denis Kibirige Kawooya, “Act of Parliament: The Role
of Parliament in the Legislative Process: A Commonwealth
Perspective,” European Journal of Law Reform 12 (2010):
32-57.
41 Helmuth Schultze-Fielitz, “Wege, Umwege oder Holzwege
zu besserer Gesetzgebung durch sachverständige Beratung, Begründung, Folgeabschätzung und Wirkungskontrolle
[Ways, Detours or wrong tracks to better lawmaking through
authorized experts counsel, explanatory statement, impact assessment and outcome control],” Juristische Zeitung (2004):
862-871.
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must solve the problem of how complex collective
decision making – especially, but not restricted to,
lawmaking – can be both democratically legitimized
and functionally adequate to regulate the internet or
other complex fields of society.
There is, however, a third category of quality criteria
regarding lawmaking. These revolve around aspects
such as transparency and regulatory fit into the existing
legal framework. These more formal aspects of good
lawmaking are, generally speaking, not affected by the
problem discussed here.42 However, there are interdependencies. Transparency of the lawmaking process
can enable other stakeholders to bring in their views
as well as their knowledge and their interpretation of
reality.
It is plausible to assume that the parliament as an institution faces difficulties in meeting the second set of
quality criteria outlined above. There is in fact a group
of knowledge brokers ready to fill the informational
gaps the parliament has, and those are the lobbyists.
Lobbyism is an important factor in the knowledge
ecology of modern democracies. However, since not all
interests present in a society have the same resources
to lobby their interests, there is an inherent tension
with democratic principles when the parliament is cognitively dominated by lobbyists.43
Lobbyism can be construed as the attempt to regulate
regulation; therefore it can make use of all traditional
regulatory resources like power, money, and knowledge.44 If we can assume that the scarce and therefore
vital resource in modern democracies is knowledge, it
seems rational to deploy a knowledge-based strategy
of lobbyism. In helping the politician to understand this
complex reality, a lobbyist can try to give any issues
the “proper” spin, e.g. as regards cause-and-effect
patterns or leading opinions.

42 “Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and
Governance,” OECD, pp 4-6, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf.
43 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts
Congress - and a Plan to Stop It, (New York, NY: Twelve/Hachette, 2011); Marc Abélès, “Rethinking NGOs: The Economy
of Survival and Global Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 15 no. 1 (2008): 241-258.
44 Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, “Regulierungswissen in der Regulierung,” University of Hamburg, 2012, p. 2, http://www.jura.
uni-hamburg.de/public/personen/hoffmann-riem/4.pdf.
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3. Multistakeholderism and the
Knowledge Problem
The situation becomes even more complex if we
consider multistakeholder decision-making environments such as the ecosystem we find in global internet
governance. The scope of this article will not discuss
the problem of multistakeholder governance seeking
for legitimacy.45 However, we can state that in the
absence of formal democratic means of attaining legitimacy, multistakeholder concepts do not necessarily
have the above-mentioned tension between conditions
that guarantee adequate problem-solving and conditions that ensure democratic legitimization. Conversely,
organizations governed by multistakeholder concepts
can enhance their legitimation basis through adequate
means of knowledge processing. Insofar as traditional
lawmaking is one aim of the multistakeholder process,
the process itself can be part of the above-mentioned
solution to the knowledge problem. Additionally, insofar
as an organization involved in the stakeholder-process
becomes parliament-like, it can face similar problems
as mentioned above.
The working document drafted by the Panel on Global
Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms
(2014) reflects the knowledge problem at least to some
extent. The suggested “expert communities” especially
reflects the need for collective learning as an internet
governance enabler. Furthermore, the “desirable properties” discussed at the panel’s 2013 London meeting
include the “exchange of knowledge and expertise” as
a property. However, the working document, like other
similar documents in this context, does not reflect the
knowledge-perspective as a specific issue. This may
be due to the fact that the whole process tends to lose
touch with the actual problem-solving and decisionmaking within the governance structure, and contents
itself with discussing the governance structure as such.
Online participation may have the potential to be at
least part of the solution to the knowledge problem. It
is through this lens that we now look to the Marco Civil
process and the German experience.

45 Jeremy Malcolm, Multistakeholder Governance and the
Internet Governance Forum, (Terminus Press, 2008) 68-70,
323-333; Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, “Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of
Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy,” KSG Working Paper No. 01-004, February 2001.
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III. Brazil – The Marco Civil
Experience
From an outsider’s perspective, and focusing on
the knowledge aspect of lawmaking, the Marco Civil
appears to be remarkable in various aspects.
Regarding the content of the law, it is noteworthy that
the regulatory approach is basically using principles to
govern the internet. The law does not try to address
different regulatory goals by addressing legal cases
rather, it seeks to formulate principles. The law takes
into account the internet’s potential as a field for communication (Art. 3 I) and innovation (Art. 4 III). This
technique of regulation can be viewed as a way to
deal with knowledge problems. As the internet is an
extremely complex sociological entity, it is nearly impossible to define the scope of a rule in a fashion that
is not outdated with changes in technology or social
practice.
The process of lawmaking has been remarkable as
well. It began with collaboration between the Ministry
of Justice and a group of professors from the Getulio
Vargas Foundation’s Center for Technology and Society
(CTS-FGV). Including academics in the process of
drafting laws significantly changes the knowledge
ecology compared to traditional forms of lawmaking. In
this case, the team working on the draft law had considerable experiences and remarkable relationships
with colleagues abroad, which meant that they could
incorporate aspects of laws from other countries, thus
ensuring that a Brazilian law would meet international
standards on human rights such as the freedom of expression. Most of the academics involved in the initial
drafting of the law remained active in the lawmaking
process that followed, which interspersed academic
knowledge at all stages of the process.
Of course the most discussed aspect of Marco Civil’s
lawmaking process was the decentralized and open
consultation, followed by the debating and drafting
of the regulatory framework. This took place in two
stages: First in October 2009, experts focused on
principles and aspects possibly missing in the initial
draft of the law. This process was followed by a second
stage where individuals, civil society organizations,
and domestic and foreign companies commented on
the draft law.

This kind of participatory lawmaking is often discussed
in context of “empowerment,” neglecting the aspect
of knowledge. In drafting internet laws of this nature,
the lawmaker has to anticipate the effects different
solutions for a regulatory problem can have in different
fields of society, in this case especially regarding free
speech or economic innovation. In fact, many of the
contributions to the Marco Civil draft law focus on
the potential effects that bill may have, providing the
cognitive basis for lawmaking. Will a specific form of
liability be likely to create chilling effects? What means
of circumvention are available? What are the most likely
reactions of multi-national providers facing regulation?
To answers these questions one needs complex,
internet-specific knowledge. This wisdom-of-the-crowd
effect in lawmaking should be examined more closely
in the academic discourse.
The Marco Civil process also demonstrated that the
risk of participatory procedures being “high jacked”
by interest groups is not a mere phantasm. Individual
remarks on the draft from one particular IP address
have raised suspicions of political astroturfing.46

IV. Experience Gained in Germany –
Enquete Commission
Parliaments already have various instruments at their
disposal to solve the knowledge problem. There are
possibilities for getting insights from stakeholders as
well as independent experts in hearings. Furthermore,
some parliaments have internal research bureaus that
vary greatly in manpower and resources, including the
Congressional Research service of the US Congress,
the Science and Technology Options Assessment of
the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Office of
Science and Technology (POST) in Great Britain, the
Comitato per la Valutazione delle Scelte Scientifiche
46 Caroline W. Lee, “The roots of astroturfing,” Contexts (Winter
2010): 73-75, http://dspace.lafayette.edu:8080/bitstream/handle/10385/638/Lee-Contexts-vol9-no1-2010.pdf?sequence=1;
Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael Conover, Mark Meiss, Bruno Goncalves, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer, “Detecting
and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media,” International
AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (2011):
pp. 297-304, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/viewFile/2850/3274; Kurt Thomas, “The Role
of the Underground Economy in Social Network Spam and
Abuse,” University of California, Berkeley, 2013, p. 65, http://
www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013201.pdf.
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e Tecnologiche (VAST) in Italy, the Research Department in Estonia, the Service des Etudes et de la
documentation of the French National Assembly, and
the Research Services (“Wissenschaftlicher Dienst”)
of the German Bundestag. Additionally, the staff of the
parliament itself plays a pivotal role in the knowledge
ecology of parliaments.
Some parliaments have additional means at their
disposal to tackle structural knowledge problems. The
so-called “Enquete Commission” used by parliaments
in Germany and Austria is one such tool. The Enquete
Commission is a special parliamentary committee commissioned by the parliament to give advice on specific
issues, which are outlined in the resolution that authorizes the commission’s appointment.47 The German
Bundestag can establish such a commission under
Article 56 of the rules of internal procedure to prepare
decisions on particularly relevant and extensive fields
of decision-making. The idea is to institutionalize a
learning process that crosses the line between the
territory of the parliament and other organizations.
Enquete Commissions are composed of a number of
members of parliament and external experts.
Knowledge sociology teaches that diverse perspectives within a committee can produce a specific brand
of knowledge that cannot be substituted in any other
way.48 In May 2010, the German parliament established
an Enquete Commission on the issue of “Internet and
Digital Society.” The commission produced suggestions in several volumes of its final report that touched
on issues such as data protection, copyrights, media
literacy, public sphere and culture, science, and technology.
The impact of these suggestions has so far been
limited, however, some suggestions made it into the
coalition treaty of the new German government in the
fall of 2013. One suggested creating a permanent parliamentary committee on digital society issues, an idea
that was put into action in February 2014.
47 Susanne Linn, and Frank Sobolewski, “The German Bundestag: Functions and Procedures. Organization and working
methods. The legislation of the Federation.” Rheinbreitbach:
Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt (2010): 42, https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80080000.pdf.
48 Volker Born, “Problemorientiertes Wissensmanagement in der
Automobilindustrie [Problem oriented Knowledge Management in the automotive industrie],”( Leipzig: Gabler Edition
Wissenschaft, 2008), p 35.
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Within the commission, the old rule was upheld:
“Who drafts the paper wins the day.” Thus, committee
members with a back office could deliver more input
than those experts who had to do draft papers singlehandedly with more limited resources at their disposal.
The German Enquete Commission on “Internet and
Digital Society” is worth studying because it represents
a specific set of different perspectives within the formal
framework of a parliamentary commission. The Commission tried to make its work a kind of test case for
participation, however, this endeavor was only partly
successful.49 Since I have had the honor to serve on
this committee I would like to share some observations
from the participation process:
It was not easy to convince the administration of the
German parliament that it was not enough for the
commission, who was examining the potential of the
internet, to be restricted to email communication.
It took some months to establish a feedback platform
specifically designed for the Enquete Commission. Additionally it was, and is still, not possible to integrate this
platform into the official parliament  website, which only
had a link to the external platform where citizens were
invited to give input. The platform made it possible for
citizens to suggest topics for the Enquete Commission
and to comment and vote on suggestions others had
made for the Commission.
In terms of actual participation not as many citizens
as expected really made use of the possibilities the
Enquete Commission platform offered them.50 The
general amount of people who participated was rather
low, however, some topics were obviously of higher
interest than others and received more proposals and
ideas. For example, the copyright and interoperability,
standards, and free software group received in total
60 sets of comments. The group on education and
research received 36 long posts. The group on data
49 Katharina Große, “E-participation – the Swiss army knife
of politics?” in Conference for E-Democracy and Open
Government, Parycek, P. and Edelmann, N. (Ed.). (Austria:
Donau- Universität Krems, 2013) pp. 45, http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:660884/FULLTEXT01.pdf#page=46.
50 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, and Zarino Zappia, “Participation
and Power: Intermediaries of Open Data,” Draft Paper in 1st
Berlin Symposium on Internet and Society- October 26-28,
2011, http://berlinsymposium.org/sites/berlinsymposium.org/
files/participation_and_power.pdf.
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protection and personal rights had the most contributions, 95 in total.51
Additionally, despite the low number of participants, the
quality of input – at least in parts – was extremely high.
Some suggestions came in the shape of elaborate legal
text. The promise of participation was fueled by the
fact that the parliament called the participating citizens
the “18th expert,” putting them on the same level as
the 17 external experts in the Enquete Commission.
The input could have been even more meaningful
if the knowledge aspect had been more in focus. To
take an example, the Commission did not ask whether
consumers already had come across violation of net
neutrality; thus the Commission was restricted to the
one case where there had been a complaint filed with
the regulator.
All the sub-committees of the committee published
drafts of the reports, but there was a major problem
that could not be addressed until the end of the working
phase of the Commission – this was a problem of
timing. To make a credible promise of participation, the
whole procedure should have been designed so that
the sub-committees could really integrate the feedback
given by the members of the public. Since this was not
the case, it was sometimes not possible to make use
of the public’s input. The Commission has documented
all the input and made it available for further research,
but the impression was, at least partly, that the work of
the public had been neglected. This appears to have
led to some consternation among the public – one
comment on the participation platform suggested that
the platform was a placebo and therefore should be
abolished.

V. Conclusions
When considering national lawmaking process, even
in a multistakeholder environment, the parliament still
plays a major role. If we assume that regulation in
complex fields, such as the internet, becomes increasingly a knowledge problem, we should not neglect the
procedures that organize the gathering, production and
construction of knowledge in the process of lawmaking.
These case studies demonstrate ways to do this. At
51 German Bundestag, “Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission Internet und digitale Gesellschaft [Final Report of the
Enquete-Commission Internet and Digital Society],” 2013,
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/125/1712550.pdf.

first glance, the Marco Civil process and the Enquete
Commission in Germany appear to have very little
in common. Both procedures, however, make use
of a structural coupling of academic expertise and
lawmaking. In Brazil, it was the cooperation with
academics when writing the first draft of the Marco Civil.
In the German case, the construction of the Commission forced external experts and MPs to work together
and create a knowledge base for recommendations
to the German parliament. Both instruments – mixed
commissions as well as laws drafted by academics –
belong to the same toolbox of instruments parliaments
can use to gain access to academic knowledge.
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate how important it
is to design the whole procedure in a way that enables
participation – an attempt that was successful in Brazil
but only partly so in Germany. However, the German
example reveals that a small number of inputs can
make a difference to the knowledge base for decisionmaking.
To fill this toolbox with more useful instruments and find
better, more dynamic ways to use them, we need to do
the following:
•

Map the variety of instruments which parliaments
all over the world use to address the knowledge
problem

•

Identify best practices

•

Better understand the process of construction of
knowledge and the development of interpretative
paradigms in lawmaking

•

Explore ways that the internet can help solve the
knowledge problem

•

Define rules for lawmaking and especially participation, considering the effects on the knowledge
ecology

The development described in this essay will inevitably lead to a more prominent role of academics in the
lawmaking process. This must be addressed in reflections on the role of academics and their professional
ethics, giving academics a specific role distinguishable from lobbyists and civil society groups. Thus the
knowledge ecosystem of law is in need of new rules
and self-reflection. When these preconditions are
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given, new forms of participation will have the potential
to mediate resilient democratic legitimacy for international multistakeholder governance processes.
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YES, WE SCAN! Salvaging Public Trust in a
Post-Snowden Germany
By Markus Beckedahl
More than half a year has passed since Edward
Snowden first revealed the all-encompassing, global
surveillance programs of the US National Security
Agency. Since then, hardly a day goes by without journalists uncovering further details of a system in which
Western intelligence agencies of so-called ‘democracies’ go far beyond the limits of their own constitutions to
spy on people, organizations, and businesses without
specific cause. On some days, new disclosures come
hourly. Thanks to Snowden, we now know the answer
to the question of whether we are being surveilled, but
pressing questions remain: How often and by whom
is data collected or transferred? Where is it stored? Is
it saved forever? And most importantly, how is it used
against us?
These questions will be central at the upcoming
NETmundial, where tensions between the domestic
and international policy realms will be brought to bear
as governments and civil society advocates debate
the broader implications of the revelations for global
internet governance. The primary items on the agenda
for NETmundial include developing a set of international principles for the internet and a “roadmap” for the
future of global internet governance.
It is difficult to conceive of any “international principle,”
with integrity, that has not acknowledged and come to
grips with the issue of mass surveillance.  Consensus
on multistakeholderism, on net neutrality, and passages
about an “open and free” internet are all built on sand
if there is no clear understanding of the workings of
surveillance and its consequences.
Germany has occupied a critical position in the global
surveillance debate since the Snowden leaks became
public. Interestingly, there has been a sharp divide
between the reactions of the public and the political
elite. As Germany is a key stakeholder in NETmundial, and capable of playing a central role in shaping
policy outcomes from the meeting, it is critical to take
this divide into account when observing the German
government response to the surveillance issue. In this

essay,  I want to provide some background on these
questions—from the perspective of Germany—and
explain how various approaches to the issues intersect
with the NETmundial agenda.

Civil Liberties and Memories of a
Surveillance State in Germany
There are few countries in which the Snowden disclosures have caused as large a reaction as in Germany.
Since June 2013, politicians, mass media, civil society
organizations, and citizens have discussed its effects
nearly daily. Issues such as data protection have
triggered great interest and concern in Germany –
recent history has made it easy for Germans to imagine
that repressive structures could be reintroduced in the
country. Given the nature of new digital communication
infrastructure, there is wide recognition that future repressive structures could be far more dangerous than
any repressive structure of the past. The experience of
two dictatorships over the last eighty years has likely
generated strong public recognition of the need for civil
liberties, and a deep understanding of the importance
of data protection and the private sphere as a basis for
democracy.
If people fear that everything they communicate might
be used against them, they will become cautious in
what they say and think. This kind of self-censorship
or anticipatory obedience heavily affects freedom
of opinion and speech. If people fear retribution for
participation in public demonstrations, the freedom of
assembly will be affected.
We are fortunate that German civil society has taken
stock of these dynamics and developed a strong
network of advocacy and resistance to state control.
A large community of hackers, bloggers, and activists
has successfully fought against laws such as those introducing internet filtering, the ACTA trade agreement,
and the EU’s data retention directive. Though it currently
faces serious problems, the Pirate Party generated
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hope for a political overhaul through the internet a
few years before. Moreover, Berlin is becoming a safe
haven for activists or journalists around Snowden such
as Sarah Harrison, Jacob Appelbaum or Laura Poitras
who cooperate closely with the weekly newspaper Der
Spiegel.
The debate surrounding a global system of surveillance conducted by Western intelligence agencies is
not new. About fifteen years ago, the “Echelon” disclosures led the European Parliament to set up a board of
inquiry. In its final report in 2001, the board described
a global system for the interception and inspection of
private and commercial communications transmitted
via telephone calls, fax, e-mail, and other data traffic
by the so-called ‘Five Eyes Network’ – consisting of
the intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the UK, and the US.52
Unfortunately, the report fell into oblivion immediately
after 9/11. Beset by a securitization mania in the name
of counter-terrorism, Western states passed one piece
of surveillance legislation after another. Although the
issue remained a topic seriously discussed at yearly
German conferences such as the Chaos Communication Congress and on blogs like netzpolitik.org, critics
found it difficult to voice their concerns publicly without
being categorized as paranoid conspiracy theorists.
Then, in summer 2013, Edward Snowden began to
speak.

The German State Responds to the
Snowden Leaks
In the weeks following Snowden’s disclosures of the
international surveillance programs, it was revealed
that the German foreign intelligence agency BND
(‘Bundesnachrichtendienst’) had, within a month,
transferred 500 million pieces of communications data
to the NSA.53 This news sent shockwaves through the
political scene. The Federal Government first reacted
52 Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON
Interception System) (European Parliament, July 2001), http://
cryptome.org/echelon-ep-fin.htm.
53 Hubert Gude, Laura Poitras, and Marcel Rosenbach, “Mass
Data: Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,” Spiegel Online International, August, 5, 2013, http://www.spiegel.
de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massiveamounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html.
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by attempting to downplay the importance of the issue.
It stated that these data did not affect any German
citizen, but that they were collected as part of intelligence operations in states like Afghanistan.
Ronald Pofalla, then Minister of the Chancellery
and Angela Merkel’s coordinator for the oversight of
German intelligence agencies, declared that any “millionfold violation of basic liberties in Germany” did not
exist. He referred to written assurances from the US
and the UK governments, according to which both
states remained “within rights and law in Germany” and
did not conduct any mass surveillance.54 Doubts arose
quickly, especially concerning the choice of phrases
such as “in Germany.” After all, the US operates the
so-called “Dagger Complex,” a military base near
Darmstadt, from which they can surveil outside of the
gaze of German authorities.
The former Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter
Friedrich, travelled to the US and returned defending
their surveillance programs. He stated publicly that the
US would not spy on Germany due to its status as a
“friendly nation,” and that all related processes would
be in accordance with US law. The German government thereby considered the affair to be over.
Shortly thereafter, it became known that German intelligence agencies had made use of the NSA analysis
software “XKeyScore.”55 The agency’s defense, that it
was only testing the software, was roughly as believable as Bill Clinton’s claim that he “didn’t inhale” when
asked if he had ever smoked marijuana.
As more information was revealed, the government’s
original narrative crumbled – officials gradually arrived
at the realization that their political resilience would
depend on their ability to protect citizens’ privacy under
the law.
The Merkel administration presented the idea of a
“No-Spy Agreement” which would be negotiated with
the US government to ensure that nobody in Germany
54 “NSA Spy Scandal: Merkel Aide Says ‘Data Protection Being
Upheld,’” Spiegel Online International, July 25, 2013, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/world/ronald-pofalla-germany-didnot-illegally-support-nsa-activity-a-913216.html.
55 “‘Prolific Partner’: German Intelligence Used NSA Spy Program,” Spiegel Online International, July 20, 2013, http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agenciesused-nsa-spying-program-a-912173.html.
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would be surveilled by the US or German governments
from then on.56 The Minister of the Interior even went
so far as to suggest that citizens should protect their
privacy on their own. Unfortunately, neither any form
of public education nor any sponsorship of necessary
programs for digital self-defense were introduced.

upsetting its “friend and partner,” the US. By pushing
for a reaction at the international level, the government
could demonstrate its capacity to act while simultaneously deferring a potential solution to the future.

To react to the problem at the international level, two
initiatives were introduced in the arena. Initially, the
German government sought to enshrine digital privacy
in a human rights treaty by drafting an additional
protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), a legally binding international
treaty.57 The intention was to update its provision on
the right to privacy (Article 17) for the digital age. It was
supported by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland,
and Liechtenstein, among other nations. The US did
not support the initiative and likely would not have
signed it.

In the midst of the coalition negotiations, new information surfaced: The United States had spied on
Chancellor Angela Merkel, along with numerous other
political elites, from its embassy in Berlin. The federal
government reacted with surprise. According to media
reports, Merkel had a private talk with Barack Obama
in which she drew a comparison between the ongoing
US surveillance programs and the former surveillance apparatus operated by the so called “Stasi,” the
internal state security and surveillance service of the
GDR, where Merkel herself grew up.58

Shortly thereafter, the Brazilian government proposed
drafting a UN resolution calling for the right to privacy
in the digital age, with the intention of ending excessive
electronic surveillance and considering illegal collection
of personal data to be a highly intrusive act. Though
the US managed to weaken important components of
the resolution before its adoption by the UN General
Assembly in December 2013, the US ultimately signed
the resolution. German media reacted positively: An
optional protocol to the ICCPR would have questioned
the general applicability of Article 17 on the right to
privacy, but instead it automatically applies to privacy
issues in the digital age. Although the resolution is
unfortunately not legally binding, it is perceived as an
important diplomatic shield against uncontrolled mass
surveillance.
The support of both initiatives by the German government can be interpreted as an emergency political
reaction: After all, the Federal Government was unable
to react adequately to the heavy public criticism caused
by Snowden’s revelations without taking the risk of
56 Severin Weiland, “Troubling Questions: No-Spy Pact Backfires
on Berlin,” Spiefel Online International, August 13, 2013, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staffpofalla-announces-german-us-no-spy-pact-a-916353.html.
57 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United
Nationa Human Rights, December 16, 1966, http://www.ohchr.
org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.

Post-Snowden Political Fallout

Yet the federal government was unable to explain to the
public why surveillance of Merkel’s cell phone constituted a scandal while the comprehensive surveillance
of the entire population was no problem. Officially,
the government was still convinced that there was
no evidence for mass surveillance apart from media
reports.
It remains unclear precisely where the gap lies. Were the
responsible parties in the government and intelligence
agencies incredibly naive and – despite the “Echelon”
scandal and the surrounding debates – unaware of the
practices of intelligence agencies, or are German intelligence agencies much more embedded in the NSA
surveillance-network than previously expected?
The role of our own German intelligence agencies
remains unclear. The world’s largest internet exchange
point, the DE-CIX, is located in Frankfurt, in the middle
of Germany. Under current law, the German foreign
intelligence agency BND is allowed to automatically
surveil up to 20 percent of communication flows through
the DE-CIX. The implementation details remain secret
and may not be publicized. A small “G10 Commission” supervises the activity without adequate control
capacities, resources, or even technical expertise.
58 Ian Traynor, and Paul Lewis, “Merkel compared NSA to Stasi in
heated encounter with Obama,” The Gaurdian, December 17,
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkelcompares-nsa-stasi-obama.
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Disclosures suggest that the 20% of communications
could have been reinterpreted by the agency so that
it surveils significantly more internet traffic than previously expected.
There are also suspicions that the European intelligence agencies surveil each others’ citizens under the
mantle, “you surveil our citizens, we surveil yours, and
afterwards we will legally trade this information with
one another.” Proven instances of such an exchange
between the NSA and the GCHQ supports presumptions that this occurs between other intelligence
agencies as well.
In its coalition agreement, the new federal government
dealt with the surveillance scandal by promising some
form of clarification and an advancement of technical
protection possibilities by creating and supporting a
national IT security industry, as well as the re-introduction of data retention, which appeared in the coalition
agreement document, a non-binding contract in which
the political parties proposed an agenda for their future
government. The six-month long retention of all communication metadata had already been established
in legislation passed between 2008 and 2010. But,
after roughly 34,000 citizens brought a class-action
lawsuit to the federal constitutional court (the largest
class action in the court’s history), the court ruled the
law unconstitutional.59 Unfortunately, the ruling only
concerned this particular legislation, rather than the
practice itself. It explicitly left open a means by which
data retention could be re-introduced in accordance
with constitutional law.

“Schengennetz” and Other Solutions
While Snowden revealed that the NSA had essentially
built up a global data retention system, the new federal
government evidently believed that the proper response
to the issue was to build a national data retention
program. The answer to surveillance came in the form
of additional means for conducting more surveillance
by which all citizens would be placed under general
suspicion without cause. Their communication data –
the identity of communicating citizens, the place, the
time, and the means of their communication – would be
stored for, as of now, an unknown number of months.
59 “Constitutional Court Overturn Data Retention Directive,” Linklaters, March 17, 2013, http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/
Publication1403Newsletter/20100317/Pages/Germany%E2%80
%93ConstitutionalCourt.aspx.
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At the same time, the former telecommunications
monopoly Deutsche Telekom came up with the idea
of a national, and then later European, solution of
so-called “Schengenrouting.”60 Inspired by unrestricted
European border traffic within a certain area with
strong external borders, data packets on data links
within the EU would not be routed through external
countries, in an effort to prevent them from being intercepted, stored, or analyzed. The federal government
around Angela Merkel enthusiastically embraced the
idea and is currently pushing for its implementation on
the EU level together with France and others. The idea
certainly has benefits; however, there has not been sufficient discussion about the possible collateral damage
that such a program could bring.
There is a risk that the “Schengennetz” may not lead
to the objective of less surveillance but may rather
shift corresponding powers to the various national
intelligence agencies. By intercepting and analyzing
data transmission in Europe exclusively on their own,
chances are good that European intelligence services
can strengthen their negotiation position vis-a-vis the
NSA when it comes to data exchange. Another risk is the
de-facto abolition of net neutrality. In the months prior
to Snowden, Deutsche Telekom was heavily criticized
after announcing its intention of ending network neutrality and introducing a regime of “managed services,”
wherein partner corporations could privilege their own
services. Critics claim that the idea of a Schengennetz
would lead to a solidification of this “managed services”
regime in Europe and become a means of solidifying
the market position of the largest European service
providers. Further criticism suggests that this routing
could reawaken ideas such as block lists and other
forms of censorship.
In the meantime, the new coalition has taken the reins
of the federal government and is now arguing with the
opposition in the Bundestag about the establishment of
an NSA board of inquiry. The dispute concerns which
area ought to be explored. While everyone agrees that
the practices of the NSA and the company call for clarification, the governing coalition is blocking any attempt
at scrutinizing the practices of the German intelligence
60 Jan-Peter Kleinhans, “Schengen-Routing, DE-CIX und die
Bedenken der Balkanisierung des Internets,” Netzpolitik.org,
November 13, 2013, https://netzpolitik.org/2013/schengen-routing-de-cix-und-die-bedenken-der-balkanisierung-des-internets/.
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agency. If we want to have an honest and progressive
discussion that will move the country forward, we need
to know: Who knew which details during the largest
surveillance scandal in human history? And when
exactly did they come to know them?

becoming increasingly clear that intelligence agencies
are using this data for economic espionage and surveillance of EU citizens, there is only one evident option:
the immediate cancellation of these treaties and an end
to all unwarranted surveillance.

Challenges for Society

We are facing a great challenge.

Civil society will not tire of debating these questions.
Last fall, roughly 20,000 people gathered in Berlin for
the “Freedom not Fear” demonstration.61 Not a month
passes without a petition from influential groups such
as writers, lawyers, or NGOs demanding clarification and political consequences and amassing large
amounts of media attention.

Do we want to accept that the entirety of our digital communications are surveilled, analyzed, and retained? Do
we still live in a democracy if we conform our life to
this reality and moderate our own communication in
anticipatory obedience and sometimes even abstain
from speaking our opinions? Or do we already partially
live in a surveillance society?

Above all, the entire scandal is sorely missing any commensurate political consequences. The most important
witness in this surveillance scandal, Edward Snowden,
remains trapped in Moscow. He would be the right
person to help clarify some of this story’s many facets.
Germany should provide him protection, a safe stay,
and question him as a witness.

As democratic societies we need to remain active and
display a long-standing commitment to these issues.
We need to explain the problem, place new disclosures into context, and continue to apply critical public
pressure so that we can finally get clarification on these
questions: Who exactly is being surveilled? How can
we find technical and political solutions that will allow
us to regain our private sphere? Above all, we need
to prevent these revelations from becoming a study in
the feasibility of further surveillance measures. Edward
Snowden sent us a warning. We should take it and
thank him for the wakeup call.

While nobody outside of the federal government
believes that a No-Spy agreement with the United
States could actually exist, especially given that
this idea has been vetoed numerous times by the
Obama Administration, various EU-US data exchange
programs should be up for debate. Foremost among
these is the so-called “Safe Harbor” agreement that
regulates data exchange between the EU and the
US. “Safe Harbor” was negotiated under the premise
that the same data protection standards concerning
personal data of European citizens would be upheld
in the US as in the EU.62 That this is not the case in
reality ought to be clear through the practices of
Google, Facebook, and others, whose subjection to
secret FISA courts connects them directly to the surveillance apparatus. There are other agreements too.
Through the Passenger Name Record agreement, US
authorities can access flight data. The same holds true
in the “SWIFT” agreement that governs the transfer
of financial data. Since all of these agreements were
clearly negotiated under false pretenses, and since it is
61 “Thousands rally in Berlin to protest NSA Internet surveillance,”
United Press International, September 10, 2013, http://www.upi.
com/Top_News/Special/2013/09/10/Thousands-rally-in-Berlinto-protest-NSA-Internet-surveillance/UPI-68021378785720/.
62 “U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement,” Export.gov, http://export.gov/
safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp.

Currently, German politics are trapped between a
historic alliance with the United States and US allies
on the one hand, and its own political experiences that
gave rise to a fundamental appreciation of civil and
political liberties on the other. German politicians must
now admit to the supremacy of these freedoms. The
international process surrounding NETmundial constitutes an opportunity for Germany to act as a leader in
the global establishment and enforcement of human
rights in the digital age.

Markus Beckedahl is the founder and head of the blog
netzpolitik.org. He is the co-founder of the annual
Re:Publica conference in Berlin and of Digitale Gesellschaft (Digital Courage), a Berlin NGO concerned
with the defense of digital rights. As an expert on civil
liberties in the digital age, he has testified before parliamentary commissions on several occasions.
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Building the Marco Civil: A Brief Review of
Brazil’s Internet Regulation History
By Juliana Nolasco Ferreira
Is it possible to develop a regulatory framework for
the internet that promotes innovation, access to
knowledge, and personal privacy? Can this be done
while simultaneously upholding legitimate governments’ need to defend state and citizen security online?
The upcoming NETmundial meeting in São Paulo,
Brazil will bring together government representatives,
technology companies, legal advocates, academics,
and members of the technical community to discuss
pressing questions about the future of global internet
governance. Brazil is a uniquely appropriate location
for such a meeting, as, for nearly six years, internet
stakeholders have been debating these very questions
under the mantle of the much-heralded Marco Civil da
Internet (Civil Framework for the Internet).
Concern surrounding internet regulation gained force in
2008, when Congressman Eduardo Azeredo proposed
new text for the Bill on Cybercrime (PL Azeredo63), a
draft law that had been in legislative limbo since 1999.
The bill aimed to establish new criminal offenses that
could be, “[committed] by the use of an electronic,
digital or similar system, networked computers, or
that are applied against devices or communication
systems and the like.” Debates surrounding the bill
reflected a common idea that Brazil needed internet
regulation and control, and that this bill could serve
that purpose. Supporters also argued that the bill would
render Brazil compliant with the Budapest Convention
on Cybercrime, an agreement that sought to establish
international norms on cybercrime. Although there
is some doubt as to whether or not the law actually
met the standards of the Convention, signing and
complying with the Convention was seen by many
as an important step in Brazil’s efforts to assert its
leadership on technical policy issues both within Latin
America and internationally.
63 “BRASIL. Projeto de Lei n.º 84, de 1999,” February 1999, http://
www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=15028
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Nationally, debates around the bill triggered substantial criticism and fueled a redefinition of a desired
framework for internet regulation. One of the first critical
papers was a 2007 article by Brazilian legal scholar
Ronaldo Lemos,64 which proposed that, in the interest
of promoting innovation in the country, prior to criminalizing online practices there should be a civil regulatory
framework for the internet.
June 2008 saw a wave of protests against Azeredo’s
proposal. Shortly before the bill was to be considered
on the Senate floor, André Lemos, professor of Communication at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA);
João Caribé, a digital activist; and Sergio Amadeu,
a sociologist and advocate of free software in Brazil,
wrote and distributed an online petition in an effort
to “veto the Cybercrime Bill - in defense of freedom
and the development of knowledge on the Brazilian
internet.” The petition, which received over 160,000
signatures, emphasized the benefits of an open internet
for economic and social development in Brazil. It also
highlighted existing problems with the Azeredo Bill,
urging legislators to vote against it. The petition read:
“On the internet, the freedom to create content
feeds and is fed by the freedom to create new
forms of media, new programs, new technologies, new social networks. Freedom is the basis
of knowledge creation. And it is the basis for
the development and survival of the internet.
[...] [The text] proposed by Senator Eduardo
Azeredo would block creative online activities
and effectively attack the Internet…it could
require all Internet service providers surveil their
users, framing each user as probable criminal.
It would mean suspicion, fear and the failure of
net neutrality. If the bill is approved, thousands
64 Ronaldo Lemos, “Internet brasileira precisa de marco regulatório civil [The Brazilian Internet needs a civil regulatory
framework],” UOL Noticias, May 2007, http://tecnologia.uol.com.
br/ultnot/2007/05/22/ult4213u98.jhtm.
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of internet users will be transformed…into
[potential] criminals.”65
Grassroots networks compared the Draft Law on
Cybercrime to “Institutional Act 5”66(Al-5), one of
the toughest acts of Brazil’s military regime which
enshrined state censorship and surveillance. From
this moment forward, the debate gained a popular
dimension, departing from the legal discourse of the
legislative universe.
In August 2008, a public petition was referred to the
Congress requesting a public hearing to discuss the
social, economic, political, legal, technological, and
scientific impacts of the Cybercrime Bill. Parallel to this,
the former Minister of Justice Tarso Genro defended
the Brazilian signing of the Budapest Convention. The
following year, the Ministry of Justice began drafting a
bill intended to replace the law proposed by Senator
Azeredo.
Public outcry around the Azeredo bill, and indeed any
legislation geared towards reducing online crime, still
persisted. In April 2009, organized civil society groups
of Rio Grande do Sul – including the Labor Party,
various labor unions, and the Free Software Association – sent a letter to the Minister of Justice demanding
the discontinuance of the Azeredo Bill. The letter stated
that:
“A significant proportion of civil society organizations of Rio Grande do Sul are extremely
concerned about the possible approval of the
Cybercrimes Bill, proposed by Senator Eduardo
Azeredo (PSDB-MG). Just when we debate and
fight for a radical democracy in the country, and
strive so that there is no electoral discontinuity of
our democratic and popular government at the
65 “Pelo veto ao projeto de cibercrimes - Em defesa da liberdade e
do progresso do conhecimento na Internet Brasileira [Promoting a veto of the cybercrime bill -- in defense of freedom and
progress of knowledge on the Brazilian internet],” Comunidade
de Cibercultura, 2008, http://www.petitiononline.com/veto2008/
petition.html.
66 The Ato Institucional Número 5 (Institutional Act Number 5)
was the fifth of seventeen major decrees issued by the military
dictatorship in Brazil. One of its consequences was the preliminary censorship of music, films, theater and television (a work
could be censored if it was understood as subverting political
and moral values) and the censorship of the press and of other
means of mass communication.

Federal level, the threat of a law that represents
a ‘Digital AI-5’ emerges. The Azeredo Bill will
criminalize common practices on the internet;
make our Digital Inclusion projects more
expensive; prohibit open networks; worsen legislation regarding intellectual property; legalize
surveillance; disrupt collaborative content sites;
frontally attack individual privacy and provide
mechanisms for political persecution, as there
was in the days of dictatorship. We will have
a controlled internet, worse than in countries
like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and China. Thus, we
claim: Archiving the ‘substitute’ text organized
within the Ministry of Justice; Support for nonapproval of PL Azeredo, especially through the
deletion of Articles 285-A, 285-B, 163-A and 22,
and the constitution of a committee of members
from the civil society to draft a proposal for a
regulatory civil framework for the internet.”67
In response to the letter, Genro recognized the public
debate, as well as the critiques and problems brought
by the Cybercrime Bill. For him, the letter “[...] took the
discussion of the bill to a new level, more technical
and political and less passionate.68” The Minister also
softened the text debated within the Ministry of Justice,
assuring the agency’s commitment to correcting the
problems created by the Cybercrime Bill and guaranteeing the participation of civil society in the process.
On June 4, 2009, Special Advisor to the President of the
Republic Cezar Alvarez arranged a meeting between
President Lula and representatives from various
social movements and digital inclusion projects, with
the intention of discussing cybercrime issues. This
represented the first of various federal government
efforts to facilitate and participate in internet regulation
discussions, in order to build an alternative to the bill
that would satisfy the increasingly firm demands of civil
society.
67 “MINISTRO DA JUSTIÇA RESPONDE A REINVIDICACOES
SOBRE PL AZEREDO [Ministry of Justice Responds to
Concerns about PL Azeredo],” blog Direito a Comunicação,
May 2009, http://www.direitoacomunicacao.org.br/content.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4927
68 “MINISTERIO DA JUSTICA CRITICA LEI SOBRE CRIMES NA
INTERNET E QUER VETO A ARTIGOS [Ministry of Justice
Criticizes and Wants to Veto Some Articles of Law on Internet
Crime],” Site Jus Brasil, June 2009, http://direito-do-estado.
jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/1060525/ministerio-da-justica-criticalei-sobre-crimes-na-internet-e-quer-veto-a-artigos.
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From Criminal law to a Civil
Framework
In June of 2009, President Lula attended the 10th
International Free Software Forum in Porto Alegre. Accompanied by Cezar Alvarez, then Secretary of State
Dilma Rousseff, and Minister of Justice Tarso Genro,
he was greeted by many free software activists, among
them Marcelo Branco,69 a leading activist and organizer
of the Forum. In his opening speech, Lula recognized
the discontent of the social movement and acknowledged the symbolic precedent that the Cybercrime Bill
would promote online censorship. Lula stated:
“So I think that we are living in a revolutionary moment for humanity, in which the press
no longer has the power that it had a few
years ago, in which information is no longer a
selective thing where the owners of information
can stage a coup d’état, in which information
is no longer a privileged thing. The evening
newspaper is already old in the face of the
internet, or of the radio broadcast; if it doesn’t
come out live, if it comes out recorded, it’s
already gotten out of date compared to the
internet. The newspaper is coming to seem very
old compared to the internet, and it’s getting so
old that all the newspapers have created blogs
to report on the whole world together with the
internet users. Well, these things, these things
-- none of us knows where they’re going to stop,
we don’t know, do we? (…) This law here, this
law here, it doesn’t aim to fix the abuse of the
internet. It really tries to impose censorship.
What we need, Tarso Genro, my friend, who
knows, might be to change the Civil Code, who
knows, it might be to change anything. What we
need is to make the people who work with the
digital issues, with the internet, responsible. We
need to create responsibility but not to forbid or
punish. It’s the police’s interest in making a law
which lets people go into people’s homes to see
what people are doing, even confiscating their
computers. It’s not possible, it’s not possible.”70
69 Marcelo Branco was also Campus Party Brazil director for three
years and the person responsible for President Dilma’s Digital
Campaign in 2010.
70 “Full Speech of President Lula at Fisl10,” Software Livre Brasil
blog, June 2009, http://softwarelivre.org/portal/fisl10/veja-escute-e-leia-na-integra-o-discurso-do-presidente-lula-no-fisl-10.
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Lula’s speech marked a critical turning point in the
national debate about internet regulation. From this
moment forward, it became clear that the President
saw the connection between the Azeredo Bill and censorship and the related, requisite need of guaranteed
rights on the network.
After Lula’s speech, the Ministry of Justice, entrusted
with the task of proposing a framework of civil rights for
internet regulation in Brazil, approached and signed an
agreement with the Centre for Technology and Society
at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (CTS-FGV) to design
and organize a debate around the issue. Lemos’ 2007
article offered a preliminary conceptual framework for
the type of law they hoped to develop.
Given the novelty of the theme, the Ministry and
CTS-FGV opted for a public consultation that would
take shape through two phases. The first phase was an
open, online call for comments that allowed participants
to submit comments through an open blogging platform
or via Twitter. In the second phase, the Ministry of
Justice presented a draft law for comments. The consultation was carried out via digital tools because the
leaders of the process were committed to making the
debate truly inclusive for all internet users in Brazilian
society.
The execution of the public consultation depended on
the participation of the Ministry of Culture. During this
process, all formal public debates surrounding the construction of the bill took place within the Brazilian Digital
Culture Forum, the platform created by the Ministry of
Culture to bring together people interested in debating
the development of public policies and regulatory
frameworks for the digital world.
Thus the Marco Civil da Internet began to develop, and
a pivotal debate about what Brazilian society wanted
for the internet ensued. In the first stage of consultation, the Ministry of Justice proposed a base text
divided into three strands representing the key stakeholders: citizens (in response to the debate raised by
PL Azeredo, focusing on freedom of expression, withdrawal of content, access and privacy); companies (in
response to discussions about intermediary liability in
respect of third party content and net neutrality), and
government.
The debate on the Marco Civil attracted a community
of experts and a broad swath of civil society, leading
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to a total of 1,168 comments, countless contributions
via Twitter, and numerous mentions in blogs and news.
The public consultations allowed society to discuss
the issue in a transparent way. The process fused
different elements into a coherent response that could
be presented as a unified social demand. The process
continued until May 2010, when the Ministry of Justice
developed a final draft of the bill. In August 24, 2011,
President Dilma Rousseff sent the final draft to the
Brazilian Congress.
New questions and controversy surrounding the
internet debate surfaced in May 2012, when nude
photos of famous Brazilian actress Carolina Dieckmann
leaked on the net and were widely shared on blogs and
news websites. A police investigation launched, and
the story rapidly became a hot topic for public gossip.
In November of that year, a computer crimes law that
called for “…the definition of computer crimes and other
matters” was approved and rapidly became known as
Carolina Dieckmann Law.71 Articles were added to the
Criminal Code which defined crimes committed in the
digital environment, and criminalized such behaviors
with penalties of one to five years’ imprisonment and
a fine.
Later that month, the Azeredo Bill was approved in a
condensed version with many of its most controversial
points removed, though it added credit card falsification and treason to the criminal code and proposed the
creation of a police infrastructure to fight cybercrime.
There was some probability that, in the same week, the
Marco Civil da Internet would come to a vote. However,
due to lack of consensus and doubts around the bill, it
was postponed.

Edward Snowden and the
Resuscitation of the Marco Civil
In July 2013, on the heels of the initial Edward Snowden
disclosures concerning surveillance programs run by
the US National Security Agency, Glenn Greenwald
published an article in the Brazilian newspaper O
Globo confirming that Brazil was also a target of US
surveillance. The Brazilian government did not hesitate
71 Isabela Fraga, “Brazilian lower house approves two cyber crime
bills but postpones vote on Internet Bill of Rights,” Knight Center
for Journalism in the Americas, November 8, 2012, https://
knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-12025-brazilian-lower-houseapproves-two-cyber-crime-bills-postpones-vote-internet-bill-righ.

to react – diplomatic representatives in both the US
and Brazil demanded an explanation. In an official
statement, Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota wrote:
“The Brazilian Government has received with
serious concern the news that the electronic
and telephone communications of Brazilian
citizens would be the subject of espionage
agencies of U.S. intelligence. [...] The Brazilian
Government has requested clarification from
the U.S. government through the Embassy
of Brazil in Washington as well as the United
States Ambassador in Brazil. [...] The Brazilian
government will promote, within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva,
the development of multilateral rules on telecommunications security. In addition, Brazil will
launch in the UN initiatives designed to prohibit
abuses and to protect the privacy of users of
virtual communication networks, establishing
clear rules of conduct of States in the field of
information and telecommunications to ensure
cyber security that protects citizens’ rights and
preserve the sovereignty of all countries.”72
On September 24, during the 68th General Assembly
of the United Nations in New York, President Dilma
Rousseff criticized the actions of espionage in Brazil and
indicated that the country would present a multilateral
regulatory framework for the internet, encompassing
principles such as:
“1 - Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual
and respect for human rights.
2 - Open, multilateral and democratic governance,
carried out with transparency by stimulating collective creativity and the participation of society,
Governments and the private sector.
3 - Universality that ensures the social and human
development and the construction of inclusive and
non-discriminatory societies
4 - Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs,
customs and values.
5 - Neutrality of the network, guided only by technical
and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to
72 “AS DENÚNCIAS DE ESPIONAGEM E A ATUAÇÃO DO ITAMARATY [Reports on Espionage and Practices of Itamaraty],”
Diplomacia Pública blog, July 2013, http://diplomaciapublica.
itamaraty.gov.br/13-brasil-estados-unidos/29-as-denuncias-de-espionagem-e-a-atuacao-do-itamaraty.
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restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any
other purposes.
Harnessing the full potential of the internet requires,
therefore, responsible regulation, which ensures at
the same time freedom of expression, security and
respect for human rights73”.
As a result of Snowden revelations, the issue of internet
regulation again became a priority for the Brazilian
government. The government realized that the Marco
Civil could be an eloquent response to the surveillance
issue and position Brazil as a global leader in internet
governance and regulatory debates. On September 11,
2013, President Dilma Rousseff appointed a regime of
constitutional urgency to the bill, preventing Congress
from voting on any other issues until the Marco Civil
vote was completed. While this did not happen during
the fall, in December 2013 the Marco Civil da Internet
locked the agenda of the National Congress – no other
vote could take place until the Chamber of Deputies
(the lower house of Congress) voted on the bill. On
March 25, 2014, the bill was approved by the Chamber
of Deputies, and currently, at the time of this essay, the
bill is awaiting review by the Senate.

Final Considerations
Over the last six years, Brazilian civil society has
developed an acute and globally unique consciousness about the need for a legal framework for the
internet that matches the social, economic, and cultural
reality of the country. The public and many government
officials recognize that promoting access to knowledge
and culture will be crucial to the development of the
nation.
The subject of internet regulation remains controversial
worldwide. Issues surrounding freedom of speech, innovation, and illicit acts online continue to challenge
existing legal frameworks, which are increasingly insufficient in providing answers to phenomena in the virtual
world. The Brazilian experience in the face of this
challenge saw the debate transform from a proposed
cybercrime law, which could criminalize many ordinary
online activities, to a civil framework of internet rights.
During this process, organized civil society played an
important role in shaping the debate around desirable
73 “Statement by H. E. Dilma Rousseff, UN 68th General Assembly,” GA Debate, United Nations, September 24, 2013, http://
gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf.
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forms of regulation, and mobilizing a dialogue with
the government. This resulted in changes in the way
internet regulation was seen and prioritized, and facilitated the proposal of regulation alternatives.
It is important to note that the issue of internet regulation gained prominence in Brazil when the internet
became widely used in the country and part of daily
life. In a way, opposition to the Cybercrime Bill was
highlighted because society perceived that it would
affect their lives. Widespread public use of the internet
as an economic, educational, and cultural tool was a
breakpoint in this regard.
Similarly, the accumulation of knowledge around the
subject inside the government resulted in new alternatives to internet regulation. Over the ten years of
debates surrounding internet regulation in Brazil, the
country has seen a dramatic intensification of the internet’s use.
Finally, the Marco Civil da Internet was conceived
through extensive debates and public consultations.
If approved, the bill will be innovative, built through a
radical democratic process with broad popular participation, and cover issues concerning technological
innovation, digital opportunities, and the creation of a
more democratic information society.

Juliana Ferreira Nolasco is a graduate student
in Public Administration and Government at the
Getulio Vargas Foundation and researcher at Group
Research and Education in Innovation (Gepi) of Law
FGV (FGV-SP). She worked as the General Coordinator
of the Cultural Economy and Cultural Studies of the
Ministry of Culture.
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An Analysis of the NETmundial Inputs and
Draft Output
By Richard Hill1*
1

*
President, Association for Proper Internet Governance <www.apig.ch>.  The first four sections of this paper have been previously published
by Intellectual Property Watch <http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/20/quantitative-analysis-of-contributions-to-netmundial-meeting/>.

Summary
A quantitative analysis of the positions expressed with
respect to certain issues in the contributions submitted
to the The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the
Future of Internet Governance (NETMundial) reveals
the following:
•

There is broad support for: improving security;
ensuring respect for privacy; ensuring freedom of
expression; and globalizing the IANA function.

•

There is no consensus on the proper role of governments, that is, whether the roles as outlined
in the Tunis Agenda are appropriate, or whether
governments should have equal status with other
stakeholders.

•

There is significant support for increasing the participation of developing countries in discussions of
internet governance.

•

There is some support for: ensuring universal
access; strengthening the Internet Governance
Forum; interventions to foster infrastructure development and deployment; and interventions to
ensure network neutrality.

A leaked version of an early draft of a proposed output
document appears to fairly reflect the input documents,
but some participants might be uncomfortable with
some portions of that draft.  The final output might of
course differ significantly from the leaked draft.

1. The NETmundial Meeting
According to its website, NETmundial will focus on
crafting internet governance principles and proposing
a roadmap for the further evolution of the internet governance ecosystem.

A total of 187 contributions were submitted to the
meeting. Most of them agreed that certain key principles should apply to the internet and its governance.
That consensus can be summarized as follows:
•
•
•
•

Offline rights apply equally online.
The internet should remain a single, universal, interconnected, interoperable, secure, stable, resilient,
sustainable, free, and trusted network.
Internet governance should involve all stakeholders
from all parts of the world and be open, transparent,
accountable, and bottom up.
Policies should create a stable and predictable
environment that fosters investment and favors innovation.

These, however, are general, high-level principles,
whose implementation is open to interpretation.
For example, while there is consensus that free speech
must be protected online as well as offline, there is no
consensus regarding whether restrictions that exist in
some particular countries violate existing human rights
laws.74
Similarly, there is no agreement on how best to foster
investment in broadband infrastructure, in particular,
whether net neutrality regulations should be imposed.
In order to gather more information from the rich set
of data provided by the 187 contributions, we have
analyzed them to determine what position each takes
with respect to certain key issues that have been
discussed for the past ten years.75
74 For a more detailed discussion, see section 2 of Richard Hill,
“The Internet, its governance, and the multistakeholder model.”
Info, 16 (2014): 16-46, http://goo.gl/ejIk4Y. An early version
is available online as “Internet as a paradigm” at http://goo.gl/
qA4Zzi.
75 For a summary of this issue, see Richard hill, “UN Internet
Governance Discussion: Why Did It Fail To Agree And Why Will
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These key issues are:
•

asymmetric role of the US government with respect
to the management of internet domain names and
addresses,
• financial issues related to the increasing use of the
internet, and
• issues related to the relative lack of security of the
internet, including lack of privacy.
Another issue has recently emerged: whether the roles
and responsibilities outlined in the Tunis Agenda for the
different stakeholders are still valid (in particular that
policy authority for internet-related public policy issues
is the sovereign right of States) or whether all stakeholders should have equal status (also referred to as
equal footing).
The following issues were also mentioned in several
contributions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

freedom of expression,
demilitarization of the internet (cyberpeace),
whether new international agreements or organizations are needed,
net neutrality and government intervention with
respect to infrastructure,
universal access,
increased participation by developing countries in
internet governance discussions, and
strengthening the IGF.

Each of the contributions was coded according to its
source (e.g. government, private sector, civil society,
academia) and geographic origin (e.g. developed
countries, developing countries). Then each contribution was examined to determine whether it expressed
a clear position with respect to the issues outlined
above. Then, we counted the number of contributions
that expressed a clear position with respect to each
of these issues. The full set of data can be found at
http://www.apig.ch/Quant%20Netmundial.xls.
It is
important to note that in some cases, it was not clear
whether the contribution was really expressing a clear
position. Further, some coding errors may have been
made, thus the data should be treated as indicative,
Discussions Continue?” Intellectual Property Watch, March 3,
2014, http://goo.gl/hQclfq. For more details, see section 5.1.2
of Richard Hill, “The Future of Internet Governance: Dystopia,
Utopia, or Realpolitik,” February 2013, http://goo.gl/6Ja66f.
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not definitive.  But, as we will see below, a few coding
errors are not likely to have affected the overall results
of the analysis.
It must be stressed that this is a partial analysis of the
contributions, in the sense that many did not address
any of the specific issues outlined above.  Those contributions are of course valuable and this analysis should
not be taken to imply otherwise.

2. Results of the Analysis
The issues that were most frequently mentioned in the
contributions were, in order:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

security (86)76
privacy (74)
freedom of expression (73)
globalization of IANA (55)
role of governments (52) – though there was no
consensus on what that role should be
better developing country participation (42)
universal access (35)
strengthening IGF (29)
infrastructure intervention (29)
net neutrality (26)

There were relatively few mentions of the other issues
outlined above, namely:
•
•
•
•
•

new international agreements (16)
new organizations (10)
financial issues (13)
tax issues (6)
cyberpeace (7)

While not tabulated in this workbook, the following are
worth noting:
•

•

Several contributions called on states to limit the
liability of intermediaries. Such measures would be
significant restrictions of national sovereignty, and
such restrictions are usually negotiated internationally, for example as treaties. The contributions in
question, however, did not call for negotiation of
new treaties.
A few contributions from the private sector called
on states not to impose local data storage require-

76 The number after the issue indicates the number of contributions that mentioned the issue.
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ments, that is, to allow the free flow of data across
borders.
• Two contributions called for the creation of competitive roots for the domain name system, to be used
in parallel with the current root managed by ICANN.
One contribution called for continuing with a single
root.

3. Role of Governments
Regarding the role of governments, 32 contributions
favored the role outlined in the Tunis Agenda, while
30 took the view that governments should have equal
status (or equal footing) with other stakeholders. Thus
there is no consensus on this issue.
It is instructive to see which sources, or stakeholders, favored which position. In essence, the roles as
outlined in the Tunis Agenda were favored by governments, while the private sector favored equal status.
Civil society was divided on this issue, with US organizations favoring equal status, while developing country
organizations favored the Tunis Agenda; developed
country organizations expressed split views.
The divergence of views on this issue between governments and the private sector would appear logical, for
the reasons outlined in 5.1.2 of “The Future of Internet
Governance: Dystopia, Utopia, or Realpolitik?.”

4. Other Comments
The following are other note-worthy takeaways from
our analysis.

Universal access, infrastructure and net
neutrality
The universal access issue was mentioned mostly in
contributions from civil society, with some support from
developing country governments. The same holds for
infrastructure intervention and network neutrality.

Financial issues
Thirty-five (35) contributions mentioned universal
access, but only 13 mentioned financial issues. Yet
it is widely understood that the relatively high cost of
accessing the internet in developing countries is an impediment to universal access (see for example section
2.1.2 of “The Future of Internet Governance: Dystopia,

Utopia, or Realpolitik?”). The financial issues were
mentioned primarily in contributions from civil society.

Taxation
Fifteen (15) developed country governments submitted
a contribution, but only one mentioned the taxation
issue. Yet the St. Petersburg G20 declaration states
that there is a need to identify the main difficulties that
the digital economy poses for the application of existing
international tax rules and to develop detailed options
to address these difficulties.77 The taxation issue was
mentioned almost exclusively in contributions from civil
society.

Other issues
The cyberpeace issue was mentioned primarily in contributions from civil society. The need for new international
agreements was mentioned in some contributions from
governments, civil society, and academia. The need
for new organizations was mentioned primarily in some
contributions from civil society, with some support from
the technical community.

5. Output Document
On April 8, 2014, a draft version of the proposed
output document of the meeting was leaked.78 Careful
reading of that draft indicates that it does largely reflect
the input papers, even if some particular points could
perhaps be added. In particular, I am of the view that
the following should be added:
•

Add one new item to the Human Rights catalog
under II on page 3:
“Democracy: everyone shall have the right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs
and public policy decisions, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.”

•

At the end of the second paragraph of 4 of III, on
page 9, add:

77 See G20 Leaders, “Tax Annex to the St. Petersburg Declaration,” G20, 6 September 2013, Annex, Action 1, http://goo.gl/
Q9m7ZH.
78 Executive Stakeholder Committee, “NETmundial Executive
Stakeholder committee (EMC) Outcome Document.” Wikileaks,
April 8, 2014, http://www.wikileaks.org/netmundial-outcome/.
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“The operational aspects must not be subject to the
law of any one country, that is, they must benefit
from immunity of jurisdiction.”
Another analysis of the draft output, produced by
Knowledge Commons Brasil, also agrees that the
leaked document generally reflects the input from the
187 submissions.79
It must be noted that some specific portions of the
draft output document may raise some questions.
For example, such portions include: the document’s
language on limiting military use of the internet; the
rather strong language on limiting surveillance; the
specific deadline imposed for the United States to relinquish its supervision of certain aspects of the internet
domain name and addressing system; the absence for
any call for new bodies or new mechanisms; and the
rather strong endorsement of the Internet Governance
Forum.
Thus it would not be surprising if the document was
revised and if the final output document was significantly different from the leaked draft.
Since the NETmundial meeting is an informal meeting
in which all stakeholders participate on an equal footing,
it is my view that it should not make any decisions.
Importance should therefore be placed on the final
output document, which could provide valuable input
to various decision-making entities, including technical
standardization bodies and policy-making bodies such
as national parliaments and intergovernmental organizations.
79 Knowledge Commons Brasil, “Statement on NETmundial
Outcome Document (Leaked by Wikileaks on 8 April 2014),”
April 2014, http://www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/
internet-governance-meeting-in-brasil-23-24/statement-on-draftnetmundial-document-leaked-by-wikileaks-on-8-april-2014/.
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Now Let’s Hear From the Users: Human
Rights and the Global Internet Public
By Ellery Biddle
Every essay in this collection assumes basic goals of
upholding human rights and protecting openness on the
global internet. In internet governance flow charts, we
often see institutions such as ICANN and IETF at the
top of the chain, typically followed by intergovernmental
governance groups such as WIPO, a layer of national
governments, companies, and then finally, members of
the internet-using public, bearing the unapologetically
wonky “end user” moniker. While institutions such as
ICANN and the IETF have a tremendous impact on the
core functionalities of the global internet, and hence the
experience of all actors in this ecosystem, it is typically
at the level of national legislation and corporate practice
where we can most easily see policy determining the
experiences of users.
One could argue that until recently, the global public
had a somewhat balkanized understanding of what
influence national governments have on the internet.
Users in countries where censorship is pervasive and
highly noticeable were aware of the boundaries set by
national law within the online realm. Average users in
other parts of the world were less cognizant. If there is
one thing we can universally agree on about Edward
Snowden, it is that the documents he leaked to the
world brought most internet users into a state of active
recognition about government power over the internet
and role of companies within this field. This is a good
thing. It is easy to lose sight of the general public’s
understanding and wants when one is immersed in
the internet and human rights world—this has been an
exciting year in that regard.
As the essays in this collection demonstrate, the Marco
Civil process in Brazil and the broad range of responses
to surveillance revelations in Germany suggest that
under the right conditions, a concerned public can
play a powerful role in exposing and demanding the
need for governments to uphold their commitments to
human rights.
But it is still difficult to understand precisely where the
NETmundial meeting fits in the broader storyline. We

know that documents leaked by Edward Snowden
set off a chain of events (revelations of corporate and
political spying in Brazil and Dilma Rousseff’s subsequent lambasting of Barack Obama at the UN General
that led to NETmundial. Curiously
Assembly80)
however, the two stated objectives of NETmundial,
developing principles for international internet governance and a “roadmap” for the global governance
ecosystem, do not sound like a means to a more
privacy-protective global internet environment. There
is glaring disconnect between the policy problem that
triggered the response and the response itself.
It comes as no surprise that global internet governance
debates tend to be somewhat removed from nationallevel context--if stakeholders truly sought to find
practicable consensus on the myriad policy issues they
face, the fights would be bitter and the results likely
unfavorable for most parties involved. But it is also
difficult to wrestle with this reality in a world in which
national level policy and the actions of national governments indisputably present the foremost challenge to
promoting and protecting human rights in the digital
era. Despite their participation in global governance
forums and their pledges to uphold human rights within
the UN system, governments across all five continents
maintain powerful regimes of censorship, surveillance,
and persecution of political critics.
In his essay for this collection, Markus Kummer
highlights the significance of the Tunis Agenda within
global internet governance discussions and debates
that have taken place since its drafting.81 Developed at
the original World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS), it is the key document of reference for the
Internet Governance Forum (an annual meeting born
80 Julian Borger, “Brazilian president: US surveillance a ‘breach of
international law’,” The Guardian, September 24, 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/24/brazil-president-unspeech-nsa-surveillance.
81 “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” World Summit on
Information Society, International Telecommunication Union, November 18, 2005, https://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.
html.
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out of the WSIS) and provides critical protection for
multistakeholderism and human rights interests in other
UN forums such as the ITU and the UN Committee on
Technology, Science and Development. It articulates
strong principles and human rights norms to be applied
to policymaking for the internet and establishes clear if
general parameters for these policymaking processes.
Most notably, it presents the concept of multistakeholder participation in internet governance not only
as a favorable approach, but as one that would be
necessary to uphold and preserve the unique, decentralized nature of the global internet.
It is bizarre, though rarely noted, that the Tunis agenda
was developed in 2005, during the regime of Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali.82 Some of the most damaging evidence
of human rights violations committed by the Ben Ali
government comes from the period during which the
WSIS meetings took place. For many digital and human
rights activists, it is difficult to accept the legitimacy of
the Tunis Agenda when censorship, surveillance, and
persecution of government critics were hallmarks of the
Tunisian government at that time, not to mention many
other governments involved in its drafting.
Objectively speaking, the Tunis Agenda envisions a
policy environment for the internet that most human
rights advocates would agree is much stronger than the
current status quo of global internet freedom. At the end
of the day, if national governments can surveil, censor,
or even imprison their critics with little consequence,
what good are documents such as the Tunis Agenda or
the countless outcomes drafted for UN meetings, often
drafted before the meetings even take place?
NETmundial promises to carry many of the hallmarks
of the global internet governance landscape described
here. But it is somewhat comforting that the particular
context and circumstances, both global and national,
are unique. Despite powerful corporate and government interests that could tip the scales, when it comes
to the internet there are proven, politically powerful
forces of progressive policy thinking in Brazil.
This was most clearly demonstrated last month in
March, when Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies voted on
and approved the country’s landmark Marco Civil bill.
82 Sami Ben Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab
Spring,” Medium, Fall 2013, https://medium.com/republic-oftunisia/1907fec77df1.
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In stark contrast to Tunis, Baku, or Dubai, the NETmundial will be held in a country where there is a robust
debate underway about human rights and the internet—a debate in which the public is not only deeply
invested but has also become heavily influential.
Essays in this collection by Juliana Nolasco, Ronaldo
Lemos, and Markus Beckedahl, all expound upon
specific historical roots of public outrage over surveillance and censorship, helping us to understand the
particular meaning of internet regulation to publics in
post-dictatorial states. The recent memory of authoritarianism in Brazil and Germany has driven powerful
currents of public distrust in government, alongside
public support for strong, rights-protective policies pertaining to digital communications.
It is reasonable to argue that Dilma Rousseff’s support
for the Marco Civil and insistence on carrying the global
internet governance debate forward was triggered not
simply by the Snowden revelations, but by the political
weight and public fury that this news carried. Rousseff
was able to consolidate support for the Marco Civil
within the government because of the unique political
circumstances of the moment— the NSA surveillance
programs revealed by Edward Snowden demanded a
powerful response that legislators had to get behind.
That Rousseff was able to make this about national
sovereignty and the protection of civil liberties in Brazil,
is a remarkable political achievement, if it holds. How
this will play out in determining the actual rights and
protections enjoyed by Brazilian internet users remains
to be seen.
It is similarly unclear precisely how Marco Civil will
figure into the NETmundial, or how its presumed
passage will or will not affect other participating governments. It is, however, encouraging to see a high-profile
global governance meeting happening in a country
where a legitimate debate is taking place, and where
civil society and the general public have had a real and
impactful voice. Context for these events matters very
much.
There is reason to believe that this meeting will
open a new chapter for the global internet governance debate—that the unique, combined effects
of the Snowden revelations and the opportunism of
the Brazilian government and ICANN will set a new
tone for the these discussions as they move forward
in the coming years. What is less certain is whether
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these governance mechanisms will one day serve to
hold governments accountable for their actions at the
national level. What is clear is that the public and civil
society experts must continue to press for accountability using all the tools we know— legal advocacy,
technical research and investigation, and the simple
undeniably powerful act of raising our voices.
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